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Abstract: The presence of general intelligence poses a major evolutionary puzzle, which 
has led to increased interest in its presence in nonhuman animals. The aim of this review 
is to critically evaluate this puzzle, and to explore the implications for current theories 
about the evolution of cognition. We first review domain-general and domain-specific 
accounts of human cognition in order to situate attempts to identify general intelligence 
in nonhuman animals. Recent studies are consistent with the presence of general 
intelligence in mammals (rodents and primates). However, the interpretation of a 
psychometric g-factor as general intelligence needs to be validated, in particular in 
primates, and we propose a range of such tests. We then evaluate the implications of 
general intelligence in nonhuman animals for current theories about its evolution and find 
support for the cultural intelligence approach, which stresses the critical importance of 
social inputs during the ontogenetic construction of survival-relevant skills. The presence 
of general intelligence in nonhumans implies that modular abilities can arise in two ways, 
primarily through automatic development with fixed content and secondarily through 
learning and automatization with more variable content. The currently best-supported 
model, for humans and nonhuman vertebrates alike, thus construes the mind as a mix of 
skills based on primary and secondary modules. The relative importance of these two 
components is expected to vary widely among species, and we formulate tests to quantify 
their strength. 
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Long abstract 
The presence of general intelligence poses a major evolutionary puzzle, which has led to increased 
interest in its presence in nonhuman animals. The aim of this review is to critically evaluate this puzzle, 
and to explore the implications for current theories about the evolution of cognition. We first review 
domain-general and domain-specific accounts of human cognition in order to situate attempts to identify 
general intelligence in nonhuman animals. Recent studies are consistent with the presence of general 
intelligence in mammals (rodents and primates). However, the interpretation of a psychometric g-factor as 
general intelligence needs to be validated, in particular in primates, and we propose a range of such tests. 
We then evaluate the implications of general intelligence in nonhuman animals for current theories about 
its evolution and find support for the cultural intelligence approach, which stresses the critical importance 
of social inputs during the ontogenetic construction of survival-relevant skills. The presence of general 
intelligence in nonhumans implies that modular abilities can arise in two ways, primarily through 
automatic development with fixed content and secondarily through learning and automatization with more 
variable content. The currently best-supported model, for humans and nonhuman vertebrates alike, thus 
construes the mind as a mix of skills based on primary and secondary modules. The relative importance of 
these two components is expected to vary widely among species, and we formulate tests to quantify their 
strength. 
 
Short Abstract 
We critically evaluate increasing evidence for general intelligence in nonhuman animals in light of the 
large body of knowledge accumulated on human cognition. Current evidence is consistent with the 
presence of general intelligence in nonhumans, but we stress the need to complement the interpretation of 
a psychometric g-factor as general intelligence with additional validation tests and formulate future 
directions for comparative approaches. We evaluate the implications for current theories about the 
evolution of intelligence and propose that the cultural intelligence approach, which stresses the critical 
importance of social inputs during the ontogenetic construction of survival-relevant skills, is best 
supported. 
 
Key words: general intelligence, psychometric intelligence, evolution of intelligence, positive manifold, 
modularity, social learning, cultural intelligence, nonhuman primates, rodents, species comparisons, 
comparative approach, brain size evolution  
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1. Domain-general and domain-specific accounts of human cognition 
 
“Animal behavior is driven by instincts, whereas human beings behave rationally.” Views like these are 
still commonly expressed and deeply anchored in the Western worldview (e.g. Pinker 2010). A modern 
version of this dichotomy construes animals as having domain-specific, modular cognitive adaptations, 
whereas humans have domain-general intelligence. However, we now know that in human cognition, 
domain-specific components are ubiquitous too (Cosmides & Tooby 2013), perhaps even in complex 
cognitive tasks such as logical inference (Cosmides, Barrett & Tooby 2010) or solving Bayesian 
probability problems (Lesage, Navarrete & De Neys 2013). At the same time, much evidence has 
accumulated that nonhuman minds are not exclusively made up of domain-specific specializations, but 
that domain-general cognitive processes may also be widespread. These empirical findings have 
implications for contemporary theories of the evolution of general intelligence, highlighted in section 
three, provided it is established that general intelligence in animals is both real and refers to the same 
construct as in humans.  
The evolution of general intelligence poses a major puzzle. Because modular systems may readily 
evolve (Pavlicev & Wagner 2012; Schlosser & Wagner 2004; Shettleworth 2012; but see Anderson & 
Finlay 2014; Lefebvre 2014), the evolution of the mind as a set of domain-specific adaptations or 
modules can easily be imagined. Indeed, a small set of dedicated modules, without any domain-general 
cognitive abilities, to which additional modules can be added as needed, may be the ancestral state of 
vertebrate cognition. This perspective is so convincing that it has led to accounts of massive modularity, 
not only for animal cognition, but for human cognition as well (reviews: Barrett 2015; Frankenhuis & 
Ploeger 2007; Hufendiek & Wild 2015).  
Evolutionary pathways leading to the emergence of domain-general cognitive processes, on the 
other hand, may appear less straightforward, because such open-content processes translate far less 
reliably into fitness-enhancing behavior, and because they may also require disproportionate amounts of 
energetically costly brain tissue compared to domain-specific specializations (van Schaik, Isler & Burkart 
2012). Consequently, compared to the evolution of additional cheap and reliable, domain-specific, 
specialized cognitive solutions to specific problems, the evolution of general cognitive processes might 
pose greater obstacles to natural selection. Nonetheless, humans possess general intelligence, and if 
general intelligence can also be found in nonhuman animals, we can attempt to identify the evolutionary 
processes that can lead to its emergence, including the specific case of humans. 
The aims of this review are (i) to critically evaluate the evidence for general intelligence in 
nonhuman animals, and (ii) to explore the implications of its presence in nonhumans for current theories 
of cognitive evolution. To achieve these aims, we will review the theoretical background and evidence 
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from a variety of research traditions, such as animal behavior and psychology, psychometrics and 
developmental psychology, and evolutionary psychology. Whereas all these fields share an interest in 
understanding how the mind works, they are not well integrated and attempts at integration have not yet 
to produce consensus  (e.g., Eraña 2012; Evans 2011, 2013; Toates 2005). In the present paper, we will 
therefore selectively focus on those aspects that are necessary to integrate the findings from animal 
studies on general intelligence with what is known about humans. As non-experts in several of these 
fields, we are aware that we may not fully represent all the relevant aspects of the respective theories, let 
alone solve current controversies in individual fields. Nevertheless, we hope that this paper serves as a 
first step in achieving the much-needed integration across these disciplines at a more fine-grained level, 
which will eventually enable the development of a more unified theory of cognitive evolution. 
This paper is structured as follows. We will first briefly review conceptualizations of both 
domain-generality and domain-specificity of human cognition, and use this as background to situate 
current evidence for general intelligence in nonhuman animals, which is increasingly reported in various 
species based on factor-analytical approaches. We will examine alternative explanations for these 
findings and develop a set of empirical criteria to investigate to what extent a statistically derived 
psychometric factor does indeed correspond to general intelligence as broadly defined. Such criteria are 
increasingly met in rodent studies but are strikingly underexplored in primates or birds.  
Next, we will discuss different evolutionary theories that may explain why and how general 
intelligence can be widespread in nonhuman animals even though it is not immediately obvious how it 
can reliably produce fitness-enhancing behavior. We argue that the broad version of the cultural 
intelligence approach (Tomasello 1999; van Schaik & Burkart 2011; van Schaik et al. 2012) can best 
account for the current body of evidence. We will end by proposing a model that construes the mind of 
both humans and nonhuman vertebrates as a mix of truly modular skills and seemingly modular skills that 
are ontogenetically constructed using general intelligence abilities. We will refer to them as primary and 
secondary modules, respectively. Species differences are likely with regard to the importance of these 
components, and we formulate tests to quantify their strength.  
 
 
1.1 The positive manifold and general intelligence  
Intelligence in humans has been intensely studied for more than a century (e.g. reviewed in 
Deary, Penke & Johnson 2010; Nisbett et al. 2012). It is broadly defined as involving “the ability to 
reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from 
experience” (Gottfredson 1997, p. 13). It is thus “not merely book learning, a narrow academic skill, or 
test-taking smarts. Rather it reflects a broader and deeper capability for comprehending our 
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surroundings – “catching on,” “making sense” of things, or “figuring out what to do.” This definition 
has received broad acceptance (Nisbett et al. 2012). In animals, intelligence is thought to involve an 
individual’s ability to acquire new knowledge from interactions with the physical or social environment, 
use this knowledge to organize effective behavior in both familiar and novel contexts, and engage with 
and solve novel problems (Byrne 1994; Rumbaugh & Washburn 2003; Yoerg 2001). Thus, general 
intelligence, as defined in either humans or nonhuman animals, stresses reasoning ability and behavioral 
flexibility. 
The concept of human general intelligence is built on one of the most replicated findings in 
differential psychology. In humans, performance across tasks of different cognitive domains is positively 
correlated: the positive manifold. Factor-analytical procedures applied to large data sets of individual 
performance across tasks consistently reveal a single factor that loads positively overall and can explain a 
significant amount of variation, often termed g for (psychometric) general intelligence.  Within this 
psychometric, factor-analytical approach, an individual’s loading on this factor thus estimates its 
intelligence. Performance in specific cognitive tasks (e.g. Raven’s Progressive Matrices) or test batteries 
(e.g. WAIS) is highly correlated with g, and is in fact often used as proxy measure for it, for instance in 
studies aimed at localizing g in the brain (Burgess, Gray, Conway & Braver 2011; Colom, Jung & Haier 
2006; Gläscher et al. 2010). In this paper, we will speak of general intelligence when referring to the 
broad definition of Gottfredson (1997) that stresses reasoning ability and behavioral flexibility, and of 
psychometric intelligence when referring to the entity estimated by the psychometric variable g. For 
humans, it is generally assumed that g estimates general intelligence, based on the strong empirical 
correlations between the two, as reviewed below. 
 Psychometric intelligence, estimated through g, typically explains around 40% of variance in test 
performance, whereas the rest is explained by group factors and variance unique to specific tasks (Plomin 
2001). It has been found that g in humans has a clear genetic foundation (Davies et al. 2011), and in the 
absence of adverse environments that compromise the complete deployment of an individual’s capacity, 
heritability can explain remarkably high proportions of variance (Joshi et al. 2015; Nisbett et al. 2012). 
Furthermore, g has robust correlates in brain structure and function, such as brain size, gray matter 
substance, cortical thickness, or processing efficiency (Deary et al. 2010; Jung & Haier 2007). However, 
rather than being localized in specific brain parts, it seems to be a system-level property of the brain 
(Pietschnig Penke, Wicherst, Zeiler & Voracek  2015). Finally, g is also a good predictor for various 
measures of life outcome, including school achievement, the probability of being in professional careers, 
occupational attainment, job performance, social mobility, and even health and survival. In particular, it is 
better at predicting such variables than specific cognitive abilities on their own (reviewed in Deary et al. 
2010; Reeve 2004). 
6	
	
 
1.1.1 The structure of cognition 
The structure of human cognition continues to be debated (e.g. Ortiz 2015). Nonetheless, the 
presence of g is now widely accepted due to the pervasive evidence from Carroll’s (1993) seminal meta-
analysis of over 460 carefully selected datasets on human cognitive ability. An influential account is Horn 
and Cattell’s fluid-crystallized gf-gc model (see also Major, Johnson & Deary 2012). Fluid intelligence gf 
refers to the capacity to think logically and solve problems in novel situations independently of previously 
acquired knowledge, and to identify patterns and relationships, whereas crystallized intelligence gc refers 
to the ability to use skills, knowledge, and experience and crucially relies on accessing information from 
long-term memory. An explicit causal link from gf to gc is provided by Investment Theory (Cattell 1987), 
which is the developmental version of the gf-gc model and finds considerable empirical support (Thorsen, 
Gustafsson, & Cliffordson, 2014).  
An integrated version, the so-called CHC (Cattell-Horn-Carroll) theory, has been supported by 
several studies and is a widely accepted consensus model (McGrew 2009). The CHC model is 
hierarchical, placing a general factor g at the top, which affects both gf and gc. Most current models 
involve some hierarchical structure involving a general factor, g, and fluid intelligence, gf (but see for 
instance Major, Johnson & Deary 2012; van der Maas, Dolan, Grasman, Wicherts, Huizenga & 
Raijmakers 2006; Bartholomew, Deary & Lawn 2009). In fact, some have argued that gf and g represent 
the same entity (Kan et al. 2011), and the previously mentioned definition of intelligence in a broad sense 
in fact emphasizes elements of both constructs. 
Some models of general intelligence that do not involve g are also still being considered. Van der 
Maas et al. (2006) for instance have presented a dynamic model of general intelligence that assumes 
independent cognitive processes early in ontogeny. Over the course of development, the positive manifold 
emerges because of mutually beneficial interactions between these initially independent processes. To the 
extent that one agrees to equate general intelligence with the positive manifold, the mutualism model may 
be viewed as a model of general intelligence for human and nonhuman animals in which variation 
between species would reflect the extent to which mutually beneficial interactions between cognitive 
processes arise during development. Since across species, bigger brains require more time to mature than 
smaller brains (Schuppli, Isler & van Schaik 2012), and thus have more opportunities to develop such 
mutually beneficial interactions, such a scenario is compatible with an evolutionary perspective.  
 
1.1.2 Executive functions and intelligence 
Closely related to general intelligence are executive functions, or EFs (Barbey et al. 2012; Blair, 
2006). EFs refer to “general-purpose control mechanisms that modulate the operation of various 
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cognitive subprocesses and thereby regulate the dynamics of human cognition” (Miyake, Friedman, 
Emerson, Witzki, Howerter & Wager 2000, p. 50). In other words, they are “a family of top-down mental 
processes needed when you have to concentrate and pay attention, when going on automatic or relying on 
instinct or intuition would be ill-advised, insufficient, or impossible” (Diamond 2013, p. 136). Three core 
EFs can be distinguished, namely inhibitory control (behavioral inhibition, cognitive inhibition and 
selective attention), working memory (Baddeley 2010), and cognitive flexibility.  
Various measures of EFs have shown strong correlations with g/gf. Whereas the average 
correlation between working memory and g is 0.72, in some studies using latent variable analysis, it even 
reached identity (Colom, Abad, Rebollo & Shih 2005; Nisbett et al. 2012), leading some authors to 
suggest that the two cannot be distinguished from each other (Royall & Palmer 2014). That g and EF are 
closely related is consistent with two further lines of evidence. First, working memory can be trained, and 
these training gains can translate into gains in general intelligence, even though not all procedures are 
effective and it is not always clear whether the training affects working memory per se or instead 
improves learning strategies (reviewed in Klingberg 2010; Morrison & Chein 2011; Nisbett et al. 2012; 
Shipstead, Redick & Engle 2012). Second, growing up bilingually, which makes high demands on a 
variety of EFs on a routine basis, is associated with stronger EFs in non-linguistic contexts, and thus with 
g (Abutalebi & Clahsen, 2015; Bialystok, Craik & Luk, 2012; Rabipour & Raz 2012). Nonetheless, 
because EFs do not provide the logical problem-solving functions and learning that are the hallmark of 
general intelligence (Embretson 1995), some aspects of general intelligence are independent of EFs.   
In sum, evidence for domain-general intelligence in humans, estimated by the first factor derived 
in psychometric, factor-analytical approaches, is pervasive and backed up by neurobiological evidence 
and various correlates of life-outcome measures. The psychometrically derived g factor is thus consistent 
with the broad notion of general intelligence, which stresses reasoning ability and behavioral flexibility 
and invokes cognitive processes such as learning and remembering, planning and executive functions. 
This conclusion raises the question of the evolutionary origin of general intelligence in humans, which we 
will address by reviewing recent developments in the nonhuman literature. To do so, we will review 
evidence for g in animals, and whether it is warranted to assume that g in animals is also consistent with a 
broader notion of general intelligence.  
Intelligent behavior needs to be distinguished from behavior that may appear intelligent but lacks 
flexibility. Intelligent behavior in animals is often referred to as behavior that shows some degree of 
flexibility and emanates from some kind of mental representation rather than immediate perception only 
(Tomasello & Call 1997). For instance, when digging wasps are interrupted anywhere in the sequence of 
actions involved in measuring the size of a hole to place a larva together with a prey item into it, they 
must start again at the very beginning of the behavioral sequence (Wooldridge 1968). Thus, many 
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behaviors that at first sight look like they are the product of reasoning or learning turn out to be inflexible 
adaptations or modules (Sherry 2006). A collection of such dedicated adaptations presumably represents 
the ancestral state (e.g. Shettleworth 2012), and thus the null model against which the hypothesis of 
general intelligence has to be tested. Before turning to nonhuman animals, we will therefore provide an 
overview of domain-specific, modular conceptions of the mind that have been put forward particularly, 
but not exclusively, by evolutionary psychologists. 
 
1.2 Cognitive adaptations and domain specificity  
A domain-general factor of intelligence can be contrasted with domain-specific cognitive 
mechanisms or adaptive specializations (Cosmides & Tooby 2002). The basic idea is that whenever a 
fitness-relevant cognitive problem arises repeatedly and predictably over long periods of time in a given 
species, natural selection favors a genetically based, developmentally canalized (‘hardwired’) solution to 
this problem. For instance, natural selection may provide a species with a particularly strong spatial 
memory to retrieve stored food, without endowing it with more powerful cognitive capacities in other 
contexts (Sherry 2006). Importantly, domain-specific mechanism cannot be used in domains other than 
the ones for which they evolved, whereas domain-general mechanism can be used to solve problems 
across domains. 
Thus, the mind of animals, including humans, can be conceived of as a collection of adaptive 
specializations, often construed as modules, each of which evolved to solve a specific adaptive problem 
(Duchaine, Cosmides & Tooby 2001). Notice that a mind uniquely made up of these kinds of specific 
adaptations is arguably incompatible with standard accounts of intelligence, because virtually no learning 
and flexibility are involved. Similarly, none of these specific cognitive adaptations require the presence of 
the domain-general processes underlying intelligence such as executive functions. 
 
1.2.1 Modularity and general intelligence 
A modular organization of mind is particularly appealing to evolutionary thinking because 
modular systems allow parts to be removed, added or modified without affecting the function of the 
structure as a whole. Therefore, modular systems may be more evolvable or even the only evolvable 
systems (Clune, Mouret & Lipson 2013; Pavlicev & Wagner 2012; Ploeger & Galis 2011; Schlosser & 
Wagner 2004; Shettleworth 2012). Thus, whenever conditions are sufficiently stable or at least 
predictable across generations, natural selection should favor solving recurrent fitness problems via 
modules rather than via general cognitive processes, because the former solve these problems on average 
quickly, effortlessly and efficiently (Cosmides et al. 2010) and can presumably evolve more readily. 
General intelligence, in contrast, is thus expected to evolve under conditions of social or environmental 
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unpredictability. Solutions to these evolutionarily novel problems have to be acquired effortfully, via slow 
learning (e.g. Geary & Huffmann 2002; Geary 2005). 
The advantages of a modular solution to recurrent fitness problems, however, are not necessarily 
as straightforward. First, the fundamental assumption that a modular solution is indeed more evolvable 
can be questioned on both empirical and conceptual grounds (e.g., Anderson & Finlay 2014; Lefebvre 
2014; Bolhuis et al. 2011; d’Souza & Karmiloff-Smith 2011). Empirical evidence for a direct mapping of 
specialized adaptive behavioral functions to specific modular neural units is actually rare, even for neural 
systems as simple as those from invertebrates. Novel adaptive functions seem mostly to be achieved via 
massive re-use of neural tissue rather than via the addition of encapsulated neuronal pools. Conceptually, 
the evolvability argument seems largely incompatibly with what is known about short-term 
neuromodulation, brain plasticity over the lifespan, response to damage, and ontogenetic principles of 
brain development. The a priori evolvability argument therefore does not lead to an unambiguous 
conclusion as to the superiority of domain-specific over domain-general organization.  
Second, the other advantage of modularity, i.e. fast, effortless, and ultimately efficient solving of 
evolutionarily recurrent fitness problems, may only hold for particular notions of modularity, such as 
Fodorian modules (Fodor 1983). These are thought to be domain-specific functional units that process 
distinctive input stimuli using distinctive mechanisms. In particular, a module is thought to exclusively 
process information from a specific domain and to produce a correspondingly specific output in the form 
of representations and/or a behavioral response. Fodor listed criteria that must – at least to “some 
interesting extent” - be fulfilled by a functional unit to qualify as modular. These criteria include domain 
specificity, mandatory processing, high speed, production of shallow outputs (i.e. not requiring extensive 
processing), limited accessibility, a characteristic ontogeny (reliable emergence without explicit learning), 
a fixed neural architecture, and informational encapsulation (meaning it is not affected by other cognitive 
processes, a criterion thought to be particularly important). Paradigmatic examples of Fodorian modules 
are optical illusions. The presence of modules involving the processing of sensory information is widely 
accepted, and that their speed and efficiency are beneficial is obvious. However, a modular organization 
has also been proposed for more higher-level cognitive processes including ones related to folk 
psychology (e.g. processing of faces and facial expressions, Theory of Mind, cheater detection), folk 
biology (e.g. animate-inanimate distinction, flora-fauna) or folk physics (e.g. movement trajectories, 
gravity biases, representation of space, solidity and causality; summarized in Geary 2005). Indeed, 
massive modularity accounts hold that the mind is exclusively made up of modules (Barrett 2015; 
Carruthers 2005; Sperber 2001).  
Massive modularity would appear to be irreconcilable with general intelligence (and therefore 
with the ability to solve evolutionarily novel problems), but much of the long-standing controversy about 
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the massive modularity hypothesis of the human mind comes down to the use of different notions of 
modularity (see also Barrett & Kurzban 2006). Indeed, a variety of highly divergent notions have 
developed (Barrett 2015; Barrett & Kurzban 2012; Chiappe & Gardner 2012; Coltheart 2011; Grossi 
2014; Mahon & Cantlon 2011), and many of these are much broader than the Fodorian one (e.g. 
Sternberg 2011). Because they also encompass the possibility of overarching, central control processes 
(Carruthers 2011), they are entirely compatible with the co-existence of domain-general processes and 
general intelligence (Barrett 2015; Carruthers 2011). In fact, Carruthers (2011) argues that most modules 
are specialized learning systems. Such broad notions of modularity, however, arguably no longer support 
the original idea of automatically providing fast and frugal solutions to recurrent fitness problems. 
Unlike many proponents of massive modularity in humans, comparative behavioral biologists and 
comparative psychologists typically refer to notions of modularity that hew closely to the classical 
Fodorian modules, i.e. dedicated, inflexible cognitive adaptations that have evolved in response to 
specific recurrent fitness-relevant problems (e. g. Fernandes, Woodley & te Nijenhuis 2014; Shettleworth 
2012). Functional specialization here is mostly used in the biological, ultimate sense, i.e. referring to the 
specific adaptive pressures that gave rise to the evolution of specific dedicated modules. This perspective 
is grounded in research traditions such as neuroecology (Sherry 2006) that have provided empirical 
evidence for the occurrence among animals of dedicated cognitive adaptations, such as spatio-temporal 
memory abilities in food caching species, in particular birds (Brodin 2010, Pravosudov & Roth 2013). 
These cognitive adaptations typically do not generalize to problems for which they did not evolve.  
A mind composed of such dedicated adaptations represents a plausible null model, and indeed a 
plausible ancestral state of vertebrate cognition. Dedicated adaptations and general intelligence can 
obviously coexist (e.g. Geary 2005; Cosmides et al. 2010), for instance when the output of modules serve 
as inputs for intelligent reasoning, which may be responsible for the fact that in humans general 
intelligence predicts reasoning ability even in evolutionarily familiar contexts (Kaufman et al. 2011). The 
key questions with respect to the evolution of general intelligence therefore are how central, domain-
general processes could evolve on top of domain-specific adaptations, whether and to what extent they 
also exist in nonhuman animals, and what adaptive benefits drove their evolution. 
 
1.2.2 Adaptive canalization beyond modularity 
Strictly domain-general approaches that construe the mind as a general-purpose computer face 
several well-known problems (Cosmides & Tooby 1994; Cosmides et al. 2010; Frankenhuis & Ploeger 
2007; Heyes 2003; Kolodny, Edelman & Lotem 2015, see also Table 1). First, an agent has to efficiently 
identify relevant information and filter out irrelevant information in the process of problem solving, a 
challenge known as the frame problem. Second, once the relevant information has been identified, the 
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agent has to decide what to do with it. To do so, she has to solve the problem of how to pick and combine 
correct, adaptive behavioral options or cognitive processes out of an exponentially growing number of 
possibilities (the problem of the combinatorial explosion) or to learn important associations and skills in a 
limited period of time despite dealing with relevant stimuli that occur at a low rate (the poverty of the 
stimulus problem). Third, correct responses have to be made quickly and efficiently (the urgency 
problem). And fourth, while doing so, the agent has to find general, rather than only locally successful 
solutions (the functionality problem). It is thus beyond doubt that some canalization of cognitive 
processes is necessary.  
Evolved Fodorian modules (referred to as cognitive adaptations by behavioral biologists and 
neuroecologists) are clearly one way of solving the problems highlighted above, in particular when they 
define the entire sequence from the acquisition of information to the adaptive behavioral response. 
However, they are not necessarily the only possible way, and natural selection may also overcome these 
problems in a different way that would allow domain-general abilities to evolve. A straightforward 
solution to this problem would be that domain-general abilities co-evolve together with adaptive 
canalizing mechanisms that guide how general abilities are applied. Canalizing mechanisms can have a 
phylogenetic origin, such as a genetically predetermined preference for a certain category of stimuli, e.g. 
the preference for faces in human infants (Shah et al. 2015). Alternatively, they can have an ontogenetic 
origin, such as the propensity of chimpanzees from tool-using communities to automatically perceive a 
stick as a potential tool, compared to genetically indistinguishable chimpanzees from non-tool-using 
communities who do not recognize this affordance (e.g. Gruber et al. 2011). 
Table 1 summarizes the phylogenetic and ontogenetic canalizing mechanisms that ensure that 
domain-general cognition produces adaptive behavior despite the problems highlighted above. Unlike 
Fodorian modules, these mechanisms do not define the entire sequence from signal detection to 
behavioral output, but may be deployed at different stages during information processing. We will now 
examine the evidence for such domain-general canalization processes. 
The first problem an individual faces is what to attend to in the continuous stream of stimuli 
coming in from different sensory modalities. This can be solved by innate dispositions or data-acquisition 
mechanisms (also referred to as phylogenetic inflection: Heyes 2003). Importantly here, innateness is not 
equivalent to inflexibility because innate dispositions to pay attention to one stimulus over another can be 
conditional. For instance, an animal foraging for berries may have an attentional bias to perceive small 
red entities, but the same animal when exposed to a raptor will be biased to only perceive potential 
hideouts. Alternatively, animals can learn ontogenetically which targets are particularly worth attending 
to (ontogenetic inflection). Here, social guidance of attention may play a particularly important role. 
Ontogenetic inflection automatically arises whenever immatures follow the mother and later other 
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conspecifics, and is even more powerful in species that follow gaze (Shepherd 2010). In many species, 
including humans, immatures are particularly attracted to everything conspecifics are interacting with, 
and immatures of some species, such as aye-ayes (Krakauer, 2005), marmoset monkeys (Voelkl, Schrauf 
& Huber 2006), or orangutans (Forss, Schuppli, Haiden, Zweifel & van Schaik 2015) are highly 
neophobic toward stimuli they have not witnessed their mother or other familiar conspecifics interact 
with. Natural selection can therefore favor the disposition to preferentially use social information to 
decide which stimuli to attend to, and thus leave the specific target of attention largely unspecified.   
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Table 1: Overview of some specific problems that a domain-general cognitive apparatus has to overcome in order to 
produce ultimately adaptive behavior, as well as potential solutions, i.e. adaptive canalization mechanisms. Note that 
these solutions may be very general themselves, such as a preference for social learning. See text for references. 
PROBLEM DOMAIN-GENERAL 
CANALIZATION 
PROCESSES 
EXAMPLES 
The frame problem: 
What to attend to?  
 
Input filters (phylogenetic 
inflection) 
 
 
Socially guided attention 
(ontogenetic inflection)  
Facilitated detection of small 
red entities (when hungry) or 
dark openings (when chased) 
 
Immatures following mothers, 
or following mothers’ gaze 
Problems of combinatorial 
explosion and poverty of 
stimulus 
What to do with the 
information? 
 
Direct triggering, prepared 
learning 
 
 
Socially guided learning  
 
 
Integration with core 
knowledge1  
 
Flight reactions, learning to be 
fearful of snakes but not 
flowers 
 
Copying how to extract food 
from a matrix 
 
Embedding the expectation 
that objects always fall down 
in a straight line (gravity bias) 
with knowledge of solidity  
The urgency problem: 
How to reach a quick, efficient 
response? 
 
Innate response tendencies 
 
 
Acquired response tendencies 
(automatization, secondary 
modules) 
Evolved modules, evolved 
heuristics (primary modules) 
 
E.g. learned heuristics to solve 
algebraic equations (secondary 
modules) 
The functionality problem: 
How to find generally, not only 
locally successful solutions? 
Innate goals 
 
 
Socially acquired end-state 
preferences 
Innate template of a safe 
burrow, or of good food 
 
Learn by following mother 
what a good sleeping place is; 
copy the goals of successful 
individuals, conformity biases 
1 i.e. evolved cognitive domains that are fleshed out with experience; e.g. Gelman (1990). 
 
In a second step, the individual has to “decide” what to do with the stimuli that have captured its 
attention, since input mechanisms filter incoming stimuli but do not produce behavior. Subsequent 
processes are therefore required to determine what to do with these stimuli without being stymied by the 
problems of poverty of stimulus and the combinatorial explosion. First, in the case of phylogenetic 
inflection, co-evolution of input mechanisms and response tendencies is frequent (Lotem & Halpern 
2012), as when a moving stimulus in the sky automatically triggers a flight reaction, but also when 
individuals are more likely to associate a snake (but not a flower) with fear (Cook & Mineka 1989), or a 
taste (but not an auditory stimulus) with subsequent nausea (known as biologically prepared learning or 
the Garcia effect: Garcia & Koelling 1966). Second, in the case of ontogenetic inflection, social learning 
can also affect how the individual processes a stimulus that has come to its attention. Third, the stimuli 
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that have attracted an individual’s attention may be integrated with innate bodies of knowledge, so-called 
core knowledge (Gelman 1990; Spelke & Kinzler 2007) or psychological primitives (Samuels 2004), and 
so give rise to more elaborate skills and conceptual systems (Carey 2009). 
A third problem for the individual is that decisions often have to be made under time pressure 
(the urgency problem). Evolved modules, heuristics, or direct and reflexive triggering of responses are 
particularly good at providing fast responses because they bypass central processes. But quick and 
efficient responses can also be achieved in evolutionarily novel contexts, such as solving algebraic 
equations or playing chess, if a learned heuristic approach becomes an automated subroutine and can be 
applied effortlessly (Bilalić, Langner, Ulrich, & Grodd 2011; Chang 2014). Such problem solving has 
similar surface properties to modular organization sensu Fodor. This fact has sometimes led to conceptual 
misunderstandings (see also 1.2.3), and is relevant for approaches that try to identify domain-general 
processes in nonhuman animals (see also 2.4.3).  
A final potential problem is that developmentally acquired response tendencies may be successful 
in solving local problems, but nevertheless may not ultimately help an individual survive and reproduce 
(the functionality problem). Individuals, be they animals or humans, typically do not represent ultimate 
fitness goals in their everyday behavior. Rather, they pursue a set of innate psychological goals, which on 
average results in fitness-enhancing behaviors (Tinbergen 1963) but also explains why they may become 
maladaptive in environments other than the one in which the goals evolved, as shown by our strong 
preferences for sweet, fatty and salty foods. However, innate goals may be modified or supplemented by 
socially acquired end-state preferences. For immatures, who are most strongly affected by the 
canalization problems listed in Table 1, copying successful adult individuals is widespread and generally 
results in adaptive behavior because they are copying individuals who have survived until adulthood and 
managed to reproduce. Socially acquired end-state preferences and goals are particularly widespread in 
humans, who are highly susceptible to conformity and prestige biases (Dean, Vale, Laland, Flynn & 
Kendal 2014; Richerson et al., 2016). Increasing evidence also suggests the existence of such biases in at 
least some nonhuman primates and birds (Aplin et al. 2015; Kendal et al. 2015; Luncz & Boesch 2014; 
van de Waal, Borgeaud & Whiten 2013).  
Despite being incomplete, Table 1 serves to highlight that adaptive canalization of cognition not 
involving Fodorian modules is possible, indeed potentially quite frequent. It also highlights the prominent 
reliance on social inputs to overcome the canalization problems inherent to domain-general mechanisms. 
Social learning is broadly defined in the animal literature, i.e. learning that is influenced by observation 
of, or interaction with, another animal or its products (Heyes 1994, see also Box 1984). It is widespread in 
the animal kingdom, both in vertebrates and invertebrates, and ranges from processes as simple as social 
facilitation and enhancement learning to observational forms of social learning such as true imitation (e.g. 
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Hoppitt & Laland 2013). Interestingly, it is increasingly assumed that many of the cognitive mechanisms 
involved in social learning are of general nature rather than specialized and specific to social learning 
(Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich & Rushworth, 2008; Heyes, 2012, 2016). Indeed, all forms of social learning 
also include a major element of individual learning. This is most evident in forms such as stimulus 
enhancement, where the attention of a naïve individual is drawn to stimuli other individuals are 
interacting with, which then releases individual exploration, play, and trial-and-error learning with this 
stimulus. Individual learning and practice, however, are also involved in the acquisition of skills through 
imitation learning, where it is typical that after observation, a phase of individual practice is required 
(Jaeggi et al. 2010; Schuppli et al. in press; Galef 2015). Thus, natural selection for social learning seems 
to automatically trigger selection on individual learning and general cognitive ability, suggesting that 
ontogenetic canalization through social learning may have contributed to enabling the evolution of 
domain-general cognition, an issue to which we will return in section 3.3. 
 
1.2.3 Primary and secondary modularization, and implications for general intelligence in nonhuman 
animals 
Evolved Fodorian modules have specific surface properties: they work fast, effortlessly, and 
automatically, and they do not require significant amounts of executive control and working memory. 
Nevertheless, identifying modules in animals based on these properties is problematic because skills, 
capabilities and solutions to problems that are acquired through effortful problem-solving and learning 
based on general cognitive processes may become automatized over time, a process we refer to as 
secondary modularization. After such secondary modularization, or automatization, these skills have 
many of the surface properties in common with primary, evolved Fodorian modules. Note that this 
distinction in primary and secondary modularization is analogous to the distinction in primary and 
secondary cognitive abilities by Geary (1995), but whereas the latter has been developed specifically for 
humans, the former is thought to apply to a broad array of animal species. 
Despite the similarities in surface properties, primary and secondary modules differ 
fundamentally with regard to their origin (Table 2): primary modules are evolved adaptations with 
canalized, buffered development, whereas secondary modules represents ontogenetically acquired skills 
that were automatized during ontogeny. In fact, secondary modularization is particularly common during 
the immature period (d'Souza & Karmiloff-Smith 2011). A consequence of the different etiology of 
primary and secondary modules is that the latter are more variable in their content and distribution across 
individuals or populations of the same species. Since little is known about the ontogeny of many of the 
specialized cognitive modules postulated for humans (Geary 2005), we should also acknowledge the 
possibility that some or all of these are secondary rather than primary (Anderson & Finlay 2014) or at 
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least subject to experiential influences. For instance, even some prototypical modules such as those 
involved in face perception depend on experience (Dahl, Chen & Rasch 2014). 
 
Table 2: Primary and secondary modules differ with regard to their etiology and development, which has 
implications for their content and distribution within a species or population. 
 
 Etiology Development Content of 
skills 
Distribution Examples 
Primary 
modules 
Evolutionary; 
reflect natural 
selection for 
domain-specific 
cognitive 
adaptation 
Skill matures, 
motor 
practice 
(experience-
expectant1) 
Pre-set, highly 
predictable 
Uniformly 
present in a 
given species 
Tendency of (young) 
felids to respond to small 
moving objects with 
behaviors from the 
hunting repertoire 
Secondary 
modules 
Ontogenetic; 
reflect behavioral 
flexibility and 
learning ability, 
acquisition often 
based on EFs  
Skill is 
learned 
(experience-
dependent1) 
and practiced 
to the point 
of 
automaticity 
More variable, 
determined by 
nature of inputs 
Variable 
among 
individuals, 
populations 
Automatic perception of a 
stick as potential tool in 
some apes; learned 
algorithms to solve 
algebraic equations in 
humans 
Note. 1Greenough et al. 1987. 
 
The implication for the question of general intelligence in nonhuman animals is that it is no 
longer possible to uniquely rely on surface properties such as speed, effort, efficiency and reliability to 
infer the presence of evolved domain-specific modules, because secondary modules have similar 
properties. Instead, a better diagnostic tool for the presence of general cognitive abilities is the presence of 
variable skill profiles across individuals and genetically similar populations due to secondary 
modularization (see 2.4.3). 
We have shown that human cognition involves elements of domain-specific and domain-general 
processes, but that the same can potentially be true for animals as well. Hence, animal minds need not be 
bundles of specialized cognitive adaptations. Having thus leveled the playing field, we will first, in 
section 2, review recent evidence for whether the positive manifold (g) is present in nonhuman animals at 
all, and if so, how such a g factor is best explained. In particular, we will focus on the question whether 
such psychometric intelligence shows any of the features usually referred to as general intelligence. Even 
if we can be confident that this is the case in humans, whether the same applies to animals must be an 
empirical question (Galsworthy, Arden & Chabris 2014) and we highlight different research strategies 
that may prove to be fruitful in the future. In section 3, we will then use this pattern of results to examine 
the ultimate evolutionary question of why general intelligence evolved, and which selection pressures 
may have favored it. 
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2. General intelligence in nonhuman animals? 
Unless general intelligence is inextricably linked to language, considerations of evolutionary 
continuity suggest that nonhuman animals, especially our closest extant relatives, the great apes, may well 
possess it too, at least to some extent. The presence of evidence for executive functions in animals 
(Chudasama 2011) supports this contention, as does the overall flexibility of brains in animals, both 
during development and as response to experience, including the training of cognitive skills (Johansen-
Berg 2007; Sale et al. 2014; Matsunaga et al. 2015; Kolb & Gibb 2015). According to most 
neurobiologists, such developmental plasticity is incompatible with purely domain-specific descriptions 
of cognitive abilities (Quartz 2003; Prinz 2006; Anderson & Finlay 2014). Nonetheless, evolutionary 
plausibility does not amount to empirical evidence, to which we turn now. 
The question of whether general intelligence is unique to humans has typically been addressed by 
asking whether we find a positive manifold or psychometric intelligence, by following two 
complementary approaches: First, within a given species, in analogy to human studies, psychometric test 
batteries have been applied to many individuals. Second, broad comparative analyses (both experimental 
and meta-analytical) have been conducted across species to investigate whether species differ from each 
other in general intelligence, rather than in specific cognitive adaptations. In addition, some studies have 
simultaneously analyzed intra-specific and inter-specific variation in cognitive performance. In the 
following subsections, we will first give an overview of these studies. We will refer to general factors 
extracted from intra-specific studies as g, and to those extracted from inter-specific studies as G. We will 
then critically assess to what extent alternative explanations may account for the findings, and formulate 
criteria for future studies that should help pinning down to what extent a statistically derived g/G factor 
reflects general intelligence as broadly defined. 
 
2.1 Intra-specific studies of psychometric intelligence: g 
Interest in the question of whether general intelligence may be found in nonhuman animals 
briefly spiked in the 1930s and 40s (Locurto & Scanlon 1998), after Spearman’s g factor (Spearman 
1927) had become widely known. These studies reported positive correlations across various types of 
tasks, but predominantly concerning mazes and mostly in non-primate species such as mice, rats and 
chicks (Locurto 1997). Because the model of a hierarchical structure of human cognition and the 
methodological tools to detect it became widely available only in the late 1940s, the design of these early 
studies was often not suitable to detect g or any factor structure.  
For the next half a century, the question of animal general intelligence was largely ignored, with 
interest resurging only after the late 1990s, mainly focusing on mice and primates. Table 3 (note that 
Tables 3-5 are inserted after the main text) provides an overview of these studies that have assessed and 
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analyzed correlated performance across three or more cognitive tasks within subjects of the same species, 
for rodents, primates, and other species (see also Chabris 2007; Matzel et al. 2013; Bouchard 2014; 
Galsworthy et al. 2014). 
 In rodents, robust evidence for g is available from a range of studies, mostly on mice, from test 
batteries including as many as eight different tasks and various regimes of principal component analysis 
(e.g. reviewed in Matzel, Wass & Kolata 2011; Galsworthy et al. 2014; Bouchard 2014; but see Locurto 
et al. 2003, 2006). In general, g explains between 30% and 40% of variation in cognitive performance, 
and in rats, it is positively correlated with brain size (Anderson 1993). Moreover, heritability estimates of 
up to 40% have been reported (Galsworthy et al. 2005). Test batteries often include typical, rather basic 
learning tasks, such as associative fear conditioning, operant avoidance, path integration, odor 
discrimination and spatial navigation. Nevertheless, as in humans, the derived g factors have been shown 
to covary with executive functions, such as selective attention (Kolata et al. 2007; Matzel, Light, Wass, 
Colas-Zelin, Denman-Brice, Waddel & Kolata 2011) and working memory (in particular working 
memory capacity: Kolata et al. 2005; Matzel et al. 2008; Sauce et al. 2014) as well as performance in tests 
of reasoning. For instance, g derived from a standard mouse test battery predicted performance in 
inductive (finding efficient search strategies in a complex maze) and deductive reasoning (inferring the 
meaning of a novel item by exclusion, i.e. “fast mapping”: Wass et al. 2012). Working memory training 
did increase g (Light et al. 2010, Matzel et al. 2011), mainly through its positive effect on selective 
attention (Light et al. 2010; see also Sauce et al. 2014). Importantly, g does not simply capture fear and 
stress reactivity (Matzel et al. 2006), anxiety (Galsworthy et al. 2002) or other lower-level biological 
processes such as sensory or motor abilities (Matzel et al. 2006). In sum, for rodents, the finding of a first 
component in cognitive test batteries that corresponds to g is robust and several implications of its 
presence have been confirmed.  
 In nonhuman primates, only a handful of studies on the consistence of individual-level 
differences in cognitive tasks are available. Herndon, Moss, Rosene, and Kiliany (1997) were interested 
in classifying patterns of age-related cognitive decline in adult rhesus macaques, an Old World monkey 
species. They found a first PCA factor that explained 48% of the variance in cognitive performance and 
on which all six tasks loaded positively. This factor, based on 30 subjects, was highly correlated with a 
factor derived from a subset of only three of these tasks (all of which, again, loaded positively on it) in an 
overlapping sample of 53 subjects. Furthermore, this putative g declined linearly with increasing age of 
the monkeys. 
 Banerjee et al. (2009) found evidence for g in a New World monkey species, the cotton-top 
tamarin (Saguinus oedipus). They tested 22 subjects with a battery consisting of 11 tasks that assess a 
range of cognitive abilities such as inhibitory control, quantity discrimination and memory. Owing to the 
19	
	
relatively high number of missing individual test scores, they used Bayesian analysis and found a g-factor 
but no group factors that would have corresponded to more specialized cognitive domains (although the a 
priori classification of domains is inevitably tenuous without extensive validation; see also section 2.4).  
Among great apes, evidence for g is more mixed. Herrmann et al. (2007) developed the Primate 
Cognitive Test Battery (PCTB) consisting of 16 tasks from the physical and the social domain, a priori 
placed into six categories (i.e. space, quantities, causality and social learning, communication, and Theory 
of Mind) and applied it to 106 chimpanzees, 32 orangutans, and 105 two-year old human children. 
Chimpanzees and human children performed equally well (and better than orangutans) in tasks from the 
physical domain but the children outperformed both ape species in the social domain. These results were 
not consistent with g in any of the species, including human children. To explicitly address the structure 
of individual differences, Herrmann et al. (2010a) re-analyzed the data from the chimpanzees and children 
in 15 of the 16 PTCB tasks (tool-use was not included) using a confirmatory PCA (see 2.4.1 for further 
discussion). They found a different structure of cognitive abilities for chimpanzees (2 factors) and 
children (3 factors). In addition to a “Spatial” factor in both species, only one additional “Physical-Social” 
factor emerged in chimpanzees, whereas two additional factors, a “Physical” and a “Social” one, emerged 
in children. The authors thus did not find evidence for g in either chimpanzees or humans. However, 
human test batteries typically do not include subtests assessing social cognition. In fact, the relationship 
between general cognitive processes and socio-cognitive processes is currently poorly understood in 
humans (Korman et al. 2015). However, this problem does not explain the presence of two other factors 
rather than a single g in human children. 
 More recently, Hopkins et al. (2014) tested 99 chimpanzees with a reduced and slightly modified 
version of the PCTB consisting of 13 of the 16 tasks (including tool use but excluding one of two quantity 
tasks, the social learning task, and one theory of mind task). They report a g factor derived from a non-
rotated PCA and used quantitative genetic analyses to estimate its heritability (h2), which was found to be 
53% and highly significant. Furthermore, the results remained stable when 86 of the 99 chimpanzees were 
retested with the same test battery after two years, and were confirmed with parallel analysis. Woodley of 
Menie et al. (2015) further analyzed the data set and concluded that the more g-loaded a task is, the higher 
its heritability and phenotypical variability, as also found in humans. The more g-loaded tasks also had 
higher coefficients of additive genetic variance, suggesting that cognitive abilities with higher g-loadings 
have been subject to stronger recent selection.   
 Taken together, then, the psychometric studies in specific rodent and primate species lend 
increasing support to the notion that the positive manifold is not unique to humans but also present in 
non-human animals. Studies on other lineages such as dogs (Nippak & Milgram 2005, Arden & Adams 
2016) and birds (Keagy et al. 2011; Shaw et al. 2015) are also beginning to provide evidence. However, a 
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serious limitation of psychometric studies in nonhuman animals is that they tend to lack power with 
respect to sample size, the diversity of cognitive tasks, or both. We will discuss these limitations below in 
section 2.4. Fortunately, there is a complementary approach, which examines interspecific variation and is 
particularly powerful to reveal evolutionary trends.  
 
2.2 Inter-specific studies of psychometric intelligence: G 
In comparative approaches, the fundamental question is whether some species systematically 
outperform others across an array of distinct cognitive tasks, consistent with the notion of psychometric 
and perhaps general intelligence, or whether species differences are instead characterized by independent 
variation in performance across tasks and domains, consistent with higher domain-specificity. 
Comparative studies thus investigate whether what evolves are specialized skills or rather general 
intelligence. This approach (Table 4) has predominantly been applied to primates but also to birds and 
involves both meta-analyses and targeted experimental comparisons.  
For primates, Deaner et al. (2006) conducted a meta-analytical study that compared the 
performance of 24 primate taxa tested with 9 experimental physical-cognition paradigms using Bayesian 
hierarchical modeling (Johnson et al. 2002). They found strong evidence for G, which correctly predicted 
85% of the species rankings (but note that caution is needed when comparing the proportion of explained 
variance between standard PCA and Bayesian analyses). Moreover, in a follow-up study, G was strongly 
correlated with brain size (Deaner et al. 2007).  
In another set of studies, Reader and Laland (2002) collected data from the literature on the 
incidence of innovation, social learning and tool use in 116 species of nonhuman primates, both in 
captivity and in the wild, and found that across species, all three measures were correlated with each other 
(r2 values around 0.4), as well as with brain size. In a follow-up study involving 62 primate species 
(Reader et al. 2011), they found evidence for general intelligence on the inter-specific level (G) in 
principal component and factor analyses explaining 65% of the variance, based on measures of 
innovation, social learning, tool use, as well as extractive foraging and tactical deception. As in their 
earlier study, G was correlated with brain size, but also with a combined measure of performance across 
several learning tasks, with learning set performance (both taken from Riddell & Corl 1977), and the G 
measure of Deaner et al. (2006). 
More recently, Fernandes et al. (2014) compiled published data from five cognitive domains 
(innovation, tool use, social learning, extractive foraging, and tactical deception) across 62 primate 
species (data sets from Reader et al. 2002; and Byrne & Whiten 1990). They found that a single factor G 
explained almost 62% of the total variance. Furthermore, they report that cognitive abilities that load 
more strongly on G show bigger inter-specific variation, weaker phylogenetic signals, and faster rates of 
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evolution. These results are consistent with the idea that G has been subjected to stronger selection 
pressure than narrow, more domain-specific abilities and that G is thus the principal locus of selection in 
the evolution of primate intelligence (but see also 2.5).  
The only other taxon to which comparative approaches have been applied are birds. As in 
primates, significant positive correlations across species were found between innovation rates in the wild, 
tool use, learning performance, and social learning. These studies also found positive correlations 
between innovation rates and brain size as well as colonization success (Ducatez, Clavel & Lefebvre 
2015; Lefebvre 2013; Lefebvre, Reader & Sol 2004; Sol, Duncan, Blackburn, Cassey & Lefebvre 2005). 
 
2.3 Mixed studies combining intra- and inter-specific variation  
Some studies have pursued a mixed approach by applying test batteries to multiple individuals 
from several species (Table 5). For instance, Herrmann & Call (2012) analyzed data of 23 individuals 
from all four nonhuman great ape species, which were studied in a range of tasks from the physical 
domain, and found no support for the existence of g. Nevertheless, some subjects performed particularly 
well (or poorly) across tasks, both in the sample of 23 great apes and in the 106 chimpanzees mentioned 
above (Herrmann et al. 2010a), indicating that there was some consistency in individual performance. 
In another mixed study, Amici et al. (2012) found no evidence for G or g when re-analyzing data 
from seven primate species (all four great ape species, long-tailed macaques, spider monkeys, and 
capuchin monkeys, totaling 99 individuals) from 17 cognitive tasks. In the Bayesian approach used to 
analyze the data (see also Barney, Amici, Aureli, Call & Johnson 2015), the 17 tasks were a priori 
attributed to the domains of inhibition, memory, transposition and support, similar to Herrmann et al. 
(2010a).  
In contrast to intra- and inter-specific studies, mixed studies thus provide less support for 
psychometric intelligence. Here, we offer a tentative suggestion to explain this absence of evidence for 
psychometric intelligence in mixed studies which will need to be examined in more detail in future work. 
First, despite including a large number of individuals overall, the effective sample size to identify g 
remains the number of individuals within each species, and to identify G is the number of species.  This 
may strongly influence the outcome since in mixed studies the detection of G is not based on average 
species-specific performance as is done in inter-specific studies, but based on individual values, which are 
more susceptible to noise. A recent memory task illustrates the superiority of species averages in 
estimating abilities at the species-level. In this study, both marmoset and squirrel monkeys as a group 
provided results fitting the Ebbinghaus forgetting curve, but at the individual level, several individuals did 
not, indicating that the performance of these individuals was strongly affected by noise (Schubiger et al. 
in press). Such noise may overshadow G, especially in species that are very close in G. 
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A second issue is that in a sample of species with similar G (e.g. taken from Deaner et al. 2006), 
and thus both the great ape study by Herrmann et al. (2012) and the study by Amici et al. (2012), species-
specific predispositions linked to domain-specific adaptations may mask a G effect. Thus, chimpanzees 
and orangutans are more extraction-oriented than bonobos or gorillas (van Schaik 2016), as expressed, for 
instance, in species differences in tendencies to handle objects (Koops et al. 2015), or to solve social 
problems (Herrmann et al. 2010b). Such variation is bound to produce species differences in mean 
performance on some but not on other tasks, reducing the correlation across tasks in the overall data set. 
Intraspecific comparisons obviously are not affected by this problem, whereas the effect on inter-specific 
comparisons is reduced the broader the comparison in terms of G are, since major inter-specific 
differences in G lessen the effects of species differences in domain-specific predispositions.  
More generally, we can ask whether, if in a given lineage, a robust G is found, this implies that all 
species in the comparison must have g, and vice versa. Several combinations of evidence for g and G are 
possible, in particular in mixed studies, as summarized in Table 6, and we discuss likely explanations for 
these combinations.  
  
Table 6: Summary of the potential combinations of evidence for g and G, and under what conditions apparently 
conflicting findings can be reconciled.  
 
 No evidence for g Evidence for g 
No evidence for G I: domain-specific cognitive 
abilities 
II: g is present in only a few of the 
species involved in the comparative 
approach; or the involved species 
are very close in G and evidence for 
it is masked by variation in species-
specific predispositions 
Evidence for G III: largely cumulative modularity; 
or artifact due to lack of power of 
animal psychometric studies  
IV: general intelligence, in 
particular if supported by external 
validation of both g and G 
 
The interpretation is straightforward whenever evidence for g and G point in the same direction 
(entries I and IV), and in case of constellation IV, can be externally validated separately at both the level 
of g and G (see also 2.5). One potentially conflicting constellation is when positive evidence for g but no 
evidence for G is available (entry II). Such a result can arise if g is present in only a few of the species 
involved in the comparison, which might occur when distantly related lineages are compared. The other 
conflicting constellation (entry III) is that comparative studies provide evidence for G, but there is no 
evidence for g within the species involved in the comparison. This was the case in some primate studies. 
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In principle, it is possible that we are dealing with cumulative modularity and that by chance the 
distribution of modules across the species included in the sample is hierarchically nested. In this scenario, 
no correlation between G and EFs or, arguably, brain size is expected, which is inconsistent with current 
findings. The most likely cause of constellation III, therefore, is lack of power of animal studies to 
reliably detect the absence of g, due to the small sample sizes and difficulties to construct a suitable test 
battery, which make animal psychometric g studies prone to Type II errors (see also section 2.4.1).  
Taken together, there is increasing evidence for g in nonhuman animals, in particular mice and 
primates, for which positive evidence is available for New World monkeys, Old World monkeys and 
chimpanzees (but see Herrmann et al. 2010a). At the inter-specific level based on comparative analyses 
across species, studies of primates and birds provide a robust pattern consistent with G. Finally, mixed 
studies in primates that simultaneously analyze within- and between-species variation yield a more 
ambiguous pattern. 
 
2.4 Facts or artifacts?  
A legitimate concern is whether a presumptive g/G-factor can arise as an artifact, and a legitimate 
question is what exactly it corresponds to. We will now review why statistical or methodological artifacts 
may produce false positives, whereas secondary modularization may lead to false negatives, and 
formulate criteria for future directions that may be used to evaluate whether g/G corresponds to general 
intelligence broadly defined. 
 
2.4.1 Statistical issues  
The use of PCAs or related procedures involves a suite of decisions, including whether exploratory or 
confirmatory analyses are applied, whether non-rotated or rotated factors are considered, and whether 
oblique or orthogonal rotations are used. A detailed discussion of factor analytical procedures is far 
beyond the scope of this review, and we refer readers to the specialized literature (e.g Barney et al. 2015; 
Garson 2013; Stevens 2012). However, because these decisions may critically affect the conclusions of 
animal studies, we must highlight some issues that appear relevant to the empirical results summarized 
above. 
First, the use of confirmatory analyses requires an a priori decision of what a domain is, and 
which tasks are associated with the respective domains (this also applies to Bayesian approaches that 
likewise categorize tasks a priori to hypothesized domains: Amici et al. 2012; Barney et al. 2015). The 
identification of domains of animal cognition, however, is not straightforward. For instance, some classify 
spatial reversal learning tasks as spatial cognition (e.g. Locurto and Scanlon 1998) whereas others stress 
their inhibition component (Tapp et al. 2003). In reality, of course, subjects may recruit several specific 
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abilities to solve a particular task, and in fact different subjects may even recruit a different mix. 
Accordingly, Hopkins et al. (2014) found that their exploratory PCA findings were not entirely consistent 
with the a priori structure of the PCTB originally proposed by Herrmann et al. (2007, 2010a). An a priori 
allocation of tasks to domains is thus not straightforward; in fact, the structure of a species’ cognition is 
an empirical question (see also section 1.1.1 for corresponding efforts in human intelligence research). 
Accordingly, the use of confirmatory techniques may lead to diverging results compared to analytical 
approaches that are a priori agnostic with regard to factor structure.  
Second, studies vary with regard to whether they present rotated or non-rotated solutions. Since 
rotations are designed to make the pattern of factor loadings more pronounced, it is generally 
recommended to use non-rotated solutions in g studies (Galsworthy et al. 2014; Jensen & Weng 1994; 
Locurto, Fortin & Sullivan 2003; Plomin 2001; Woodley of Menie, Fernandes & Hopkins 2015). Rotated 
and non-rotated solutions from the same data set are presented in Hopkins et al. (2014) and Woodley of 
Menie et al. (2015). Whereas the varimax-rotated solution (Hopkins et al. 2014, Table 1) appeared to 
suggest that a general factor g was lacking, the results of non-rotated solutions, verified by parallel 
analysis, demonstrated it was in fact present.  
Third, a common intuition in general intelligence studies on animals is to compare the amount of 
variance explained by a first factor, and to conclude that the higher the amount of explained variance, the 
stronger the evidence for g. In human studies, the first non-rotated factor typically accounts for about 40% 
of variance (Plomin 2001), which is in fact similar to what has been reported for mice (see Table 3). 
However, an exclusive focus on the amount of explained variance is problematic for empirical and 
conceptual reasons. Empirically, the proportion of explained variance not only depends on the statistical 
issues discussed above, but also on the heterogeneity of the subjects in the sample: the more 
heterogeneous, the higher the proportion of variance explained. In interspecific investigations, for 
instance, this means that studies that involve species that vary widely in general intelligence and brain 
size (e.g. 20 species of primates ranging from great apes to prosimians) will find higher proportions of 
explained variance than studies with a similar sample size, but where the species are all relatively similar 
(e.g. 20 different species from the same genus or taxonomic family). Conceptually, to the extent that the 
mind is a combination of both specialized cognitive adaptations and domain-general processes (see also 
section 4.1), very small proportions of explained variance may still be indicative of a real g. Likewise, a 
first factor with high loadings of some tasks but not others, may reflect the absence of general 
intelligence, but may also reflect the co-occurrence of a general factor and one or several additional, more 
specialized domains (e.g. for spatial orientation, see Herrmann et al. 2007; see also first PCA factor in 
Hopkins, Russell & Schaefer 2014). 
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Last but not least, the most severe statistical restriction of nonhuman psychometric studies is that 
they critically lack power due to their small sample sizes. Reaching a near-consensus about the structure 
of human intelligence required meta-analyses involving thousands of subjects (Carroll 1993). Obtaining 
sample sizes comparable to human studies is unrealistic for most nonhuman animal species, in particular 
for nonhuman primates (albeit less so for rodents). However, replicating studies is feasible, and if this 
reveals the same factorial solution in a different set of subjects, and if combining such data sets also 
increases the fit of the solution, we can be increasingly confident that we are not dealing with statistical 
artifacts. Unfortunately, while this approach minimizes Type I errors, it suffers from very limited power 
to avoid Type II errors. In other words, if successful, we can be confident that we have obtained a real 
result, but if it fails, this may either reflect the absence of a general factor or too low a number of subjects. 
This shortcoming highlights the need to use external validation for psychometric g/G studies, as discussed 
below in section 2.5. 
 
2.4.2 Methodological issues 
We now turn to the possibility that a g/G factor may arise as a methodological artifact, because 
the results reflect variation in other underlying variables than general intelligence (see also Macphail’s 
[1982] contextual variables) or because the tasks mainly tap into problems of the same domain. 
Some individuals, or some species, may systematically outperform others not because they are 
more intelligent, but because they are less fearful and better habituated to testing, are more motivated to 
participate in tasks, have sharper senses or are simply more active than others (Macphail 1982). Ideally, 
such confounds are directly quantified, as for instance in Matzel et al. (2006). In a sample of 43 mice 
individuals, they examined to what extent the general learning ability g extracted via PCA from a test 
battery of six cognitive tasks was correlated with 21 measures of exploratory behavior, sensory/motor 
function (e.g. running and swimming speed, balance tasks), activity, or fear/stress sensitivity. They found 
that g was not explained by general activity, sensory/motor function, physical characteristics or direct 
measures of fear, but was correlated with several exploratory behaviors. Follow-up studies suggested that 
this link is caused by variation in habituation rates when exposed to potentially stressful situations (Light, 
Grossman, Kolata, Wass & Matzel 2011) rather than by fearfulness influencing both exploration and task 
performance: treatment with anxiolytic drugs did increase exploratory behaviors but did not improve 
performance in individual tasks or g (Grossman, Hale, Kolata & Matzel 2007). Likewise, temporary 
environmental enrichment resulting in increased exploration tendency did not improve performance on 
the cognitive test battery (Light et al. 2008). Thus, exploration and g may co-vary because more 
exploratory individuals are more likely to encounter contingencies in the environment that promote 
learning and problem solving, which over time leads to greater experience. The correlation between 
26	
	
exploration and g may thus reflect a long-term, cumulative effect of experience on g. This is in line with 
investment theory (Cattell 1987), and with findings in human infants, where the preference for novelty 
and habituation is positively correlated with later performance in IQ tests (Teubert, Vierhaus & Lohaus 
2011), but also with apes, where individuals more likely to approach novel objects and a human stranger 
performed better in physical cognition tasks (Herrmann et al. 2007). Thus, the rodent studies support the 
idea that g is not an artifact of confounding factors. 
Another non-cognitive factor that may explain variation in cognitive performance is motivation to 
participate. Female callitrichid monkeys have been reported to outperform males in problem-solving tasks 
(Brown, Kaplan, Rogers & Vallortigara 2010; Yamamoto, Domeniconi & Box  2004). However, female 
callitrichids are typically also more food-motivated, whereas males are more vigilant than females 
(Koenig 1998). Accordingly, males are less interested in participating in experimental tasks and more 
easily emotionally aroused during testing. But if male performance is controlled for the presence of 
attention to the test stimuli, their performance is no longer inferior to that of females (Schubiger, 
Wüstholz, Wunder & Burkart 2015). The sexes thus do not differ in cognitive ability, but in their 
motivation to participate in experimental tasks.  
The problem that we may never be sure if species differences in cognitive performance are the 
results of differences in cognitive ability or differences in contextual variables (Macphail 1982) remains 
an ongoing challenge for any species comparison. Nevertheless, not all tasks are affected by this problem 
to the same extent. Reversal learning tasks, for instance, are arguably less affected, since individuals first 
have to reach a criterion of making an initial discrimination. Differences in sensory-motor abilities etc. 
may well influence how difficult it is for a species to learn a particular discrimination. However, the 
crucial test is applied only once a specific criterion has been reached, and at least in marmosets, the time 
needed to achieve this criterion does not predict performance in the reversal trials (Strasser & Burkart 
2012). Furthermore, it is reassuring that the strongest association between a specific task and G in Deaner 
et al. (2006) was the one between reversal learning and G.  
A second fundamental methodological issue refers to the task selection and battery development. 
As to task design, it is increasingly recognized that small differences in methodological details can 
strongly influence task performance, which has to be taken into account when performing species 
comparisons. For instance, memory performance strongly depends on task format both in marmosets and 
squirrel monkeys. Tests of memory often rely on a two-option choice task (e.g. Banerjee et al. 2009), but 
many individuals are then happy to follow a random choice, which yields a 50% reward rate. When the 
choice involves many more options, subjects will be more motivated to remember the location of the food 
items and provide more accurate estimates of their ability to memorize the location of the food item 
(Schubiger et al. press). As to battery design, if all tasks in the test battery are drawn from the same 
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domain (i.e. a lower-order group factor), rather than from a variety of domains, the positive correlations 
will reflect a domain-specific ability rather than a more general underlying cognitive factor (g/G). For 
instance, a positive manifold across a number of maze tasks is consistent with a spatial factor, but not 
informative with regard to g. The issue of task selection is thus closely linked to the identification of 
domains in animal cognition, which in fact is part of the empirical question that needs to be addressed in 
intelligence research in animals in general, by using batteries as diverse as possible and statistical 
procedures that are a priori agnostic to the underlying factor structure. 
 
2.4.3 False negatives as a result of secondary modularization  
Task selection may also bias the result and potentially produce false negatives if tasks prone to 
secondary modularization are included. Secondary modularization refers to the process that during 
ontogeny, individuals may specialize on a specific set of problems in a particular domain (Table 2). 
Problem solving in this domain becomes automatized and thus acquires many features commonly 
associated with modules rather than domain-general reasoning, in particular fast and frugal information 
processing, which is independent of reasoning. Thus, despite the presence of g in a given species, 
performance among individuals across domains need not be correlated whenever heterogeneous 
developmental inputs prevail that lead different individuals to specialize in different tasks (Figure 1c). 
This applies in particular to the small samples typical for nonhuman primate studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Performance across different cognitive domains (D1-D4). Each line represents the performance of an 
individual (or, in highly cultural species, of a population). a) Performance is driven by domain-specific abilities; all 
individuals perform well in some domains but worse in others, but individual differences across domains are 
random; b) Performance is driven by domain-general abilities and individuals experience homogenous 
developmental conditions, which leads to correlated performance between individuals across domains; c) 
Performance is driven by domain-general abilities but heterogeneous developmental conditions lead to 
specialization and secondary modularization of individuals in different domains. As a result, performance between 
individuals across domains is not correlated despite the presence of g. 
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Prima facie, the situation in Figure 1c may seem incompatible with the positive manifold, which 
is well documented in humans and perhaps other animals. It is important to keep in mind, however, that 
psychometric studies in humans are typically performed on subject pools with a rather uniform cultural 
background (and the same is also true for the rodent studies performed on lab animals with virtually 
identical rearing conditions). If in human studies, the cultural backgrounds of subjects were more diverse 
(e.g. ranging from western-industrialized to a variety of hunter-gatherer societies), and only a small 
number of subjects tested, an outcome as in Figure 1c is quite likely (see also Reyes-Garcia et al. 2016). 
The notorious difficulty of devising culture-free or at least culture-fair intelligence tests is a direct 
consequence of this problem (Saklofske et al. 2014). 
 The prime example for secondary modularization in nonhuman primates is tool use, which is part 
of many test batteries typically used with nonhuman primates (e.g. Herrmann et al. 2007; Reader et al. 
2011). Nonhuman primates vary considerably with regard to tool use, with great apes typically 
outperforming monkeys. But differences also occur within a species, both between wild and captive 
animals and among wild populations. Individuals of the same species show much higher propensities to 
use tools in captivity compared to their counterparts in the wild (Meulman, Sanz, Visalberghi & van 
Schaik 2012; van Schaik, Deaner & Merrill 1999). Once proficient, individuals show tool use with high 
degrees of automatization and efficiency. Wild populations too vary significantly with regard to their 
propensity to use tools and solve tool-related problems (e.g. in chimpanzees: Gruber et al. 2011, 
orangutans: van Schaik et al. 2003, or capuchin monkeys: Cardoso 2013), arguably because they have 
ontogenetically acquired systematically different affordances of sticks or stones, which are perceived as 
potential tools in habitual tool users but not in non-tool users.  
False negatives resulting from situations as depicted in Figure 1c can be minimized if subjects 
with comparable rearing conditions are selected, but also if tasks prone to secondary modularization are 
excluded from test batteries. Thus, instead of naturalistic tasks that test for ontogenetically constructed 
skills that are likely to become automatized, such as tool use, or the ability to point and understand 
pointing, or even to use human language systems (Savage-Rumbaugh, Fields, Segerdahl & Rumbaugh 
2005), it is preferable to include tasks testing for more elementary cognitive abilities, such as reversal 
learning, mental rotation, or quantity discrimination. Likewise, tests should avoid reliance on experience 
and knowledge of affordances that may differ among individuals depending on their biographies. 
Although it is important to identify tasks and abilities prone to secondary modularization, it is not 
always easy to identify them. One way to do so is to examine the ontogeny of skills that are suspected to 
be the result of secondary modularization. Such skills should be acquired by developing immatures after a 
period of learning (perhaps following alternating series of instances of social learning and practice: 
Meulman, Seed & Mann 2013; Schuppli et al. in press), and could also potentially show high variation 
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among adults. The increasing evidence for a major amount of skill learning by immature primates (e.g. 
Schuppli et al. in press) and mammals and birds more generally (van Schaik, Burkart, Damerius, Forss, 
van Noordwijk & Schuppli 2016) suggests a greater prevalence of secondary modularization in 
nonhumans than revealed by the size of cultural repertoires (Whiten & van Schaik 2007). Because in wild 
populations, social and ecological problems tend to be very uniform for all individuals, variation of skill 
profiles (Figure 1) between populations (that live under similar, wild or captive, conditions), rather than 
among individuals of the same population, provides an additional heuristic tool to distinguish between 
genuine primary and secondary modularity. This criterion would work for primate tool use, for instance. 
Most powerful to disentangle primary from secondary modularity, finally, are cross-fostering 
experiments. When cross-fostered individuals exhibit species-typical behavior from the foster species 
rather than their own species, these behaviors clearly cannot result from primary modules. If the same 
procedure works within a species at the level of populations, it is similarly evidence for secondary, and 
thus learned, modules. 
 
2.5 Psychometric or general intelligence? Future directions for animal studies 
A crucial question that remains unanswered so far is to what extent a reliably identified g/G 
actually captures general intelligence in a broad sense, i.e. reasoning ability and behavioral flexibility 
(Gottfredson 1997; Byrne 1994; Rumbaugh &Washburn 2003; Yoerg 2001; see also section 1.1). If it 
indeed does so, the processes underlying general intelligence (see also 1.1.2 and 1.2.3) in animals should 
be broadly similar to those found in humans, with the obvious exception of language, and general 
intelligence should be correlated with independent measures of reasoning ability and behavioral flexibility 
(see also Bailey, McDaniel and Thomas 2007). If it is not, the statistically derived psychometric factors 
may reflect cumulative modularity, i.e. the coexistence of separate, but coevolved modules.  
These two possibilities can be teased apart empirically: If g/G represents intelligence in a broad 
sense, it must be possible to independently assess its validity. In principle, an association at a higher 
hierarchical level (e.g. between-species G) may be absent within the subgroups comprising it (e.g. within-
species g), a phenomenon known as Simpson’s paradox (Kievit, Frankenhuis, Waldorp & Borsboom 
2013). In the present case, we may thus find a correlation between G and EFs but not between g and EFs, 
which would suggest that g and G were not aspects of the same phenomenon, i.e. general intelligence. 
Thus, to ensure that g and G are related to the same phenomenon, one must validate both of them 
independently. 
Intraspecific studies of primates have so far largely neglected the approach to validate g, but it 
has provided fruitful insights in rodent studies. In rodents, individual levels of g have been shown to 
correlate with executive functions such as working memory. Matzel and co-workers have compared 
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performance on standardized test batteries that reliably quantify g in mice with several measures of 
working memory, including short-term memory duration (how long can the mouse remember which arms 
of a maze it has already visited?), simple memory span (how many symbols associated with food can the 
mouse remember?), and selective attention (an adapted version of the STROOP task, where the subject 
has to focus on one dimension of the task while suppressing a second dimension that provides conflicting 
information). As in human studies, they found that g was most strongly correlated with selective 
attention, followed by simple memory span and only weakly with short-term memory duration (Matzel et 
al. 2008, Kolata et al. 2007, 2011; Matzel, Wass & Kolata 2011). Moreover, they showed that training 
working memory capacity, but not simple working memory span, promotes selective attention and g 
(Light et al. 2010). Future validation tests could also examine the correlation between g and conduction 
speed or the ability to ignore irrelevant, distracting information, which are known correlates of g in 
humans (Sheppard & Vernon 2008; Melnick et al. 2013). 
The corresponding validation of psychometrically derived g-scores in other species, particularly 
in nonhuman primates, would be highly desirable. Nonetheless, some evidence consistent with g 
representing domain-general cognitive mechanisms is already available from nonhuman primates. Within 
chimpanzees, heritability was strongest for overall cognitive performance g rather than for distinct 
aptitudes (Hopkins, Russell & Schaeffer 2014), as expected when the latter are due to secondary 
modularization rather than reflect specific adaptations. As a result, cognitive abilities that load higher on g 
in chimpanzees are more heritable, phenotypically variable and presumably the result of recent natural 
selection (Woodley of Menie et al. 2015).  
The independent evolution of large numbers of modules instead of general intelligence is 
particularly difficult to reconcile with interspecific findings of G. If we are dealing with independent 
modules, each species would be expected to possess a different repertoire of primary modules, according 
to the specific adaptive problems it faces. Importantly, across species, this should not result in a stable G 
factor. Studies providing evidence for G, however, suggest that particular species generally perform better 
or more poorly across all tested domains. This is also consistent with the empirical findings suggesting 
that differences in cognitive abilities among primates are concentrated on G (Fernandes et al. 2014). 
Furthermore, since specific skills, even if complex, can be performed with a very modest amount of brain 
tissue (e.g. Chittka & Niven, 2009; Holekamp et al. 2015; Patton & Braithwaite, 2015), one would not 
necessarily expect that G as a reflection of a large number of dedicated modules would correlate with 
brain size. The well-documented positive correlations between G and brain size thus further suggests that 
G reflects general intelligence, as does the finding that across primate species G was the principal locus of 
selection in the macroevolution of intelligence (Fernandes et al. 2014).  
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Empirical data also support a link between inter-specific G and executive functions: across 
primate species, brain size is not only correlated with G, but also with self (inhibitory) control (MacLean 
et al. 2014). Figure 2 shows that in addition, this measure of self-control is directly correlated with G as 
established by Deaner et al. (2006), which has been derived from a completely independent data set. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Positive correlation between the composite self-control measure of MacLean et al. (2014) and 
G (Deaner et al. 2006). Adjusted r2=0.66, F(1,9)=20.75, p=0.001 based on PGLS (phylogenetic generalized 
least squares) analyses. The same results are also found when the inhibitory control tasks included in the 
composite measure are analyzed separately (Cylinder task: Adjusted r2=0.58, F(1,11)=20.75, p=0.002; A-
not-B error: Adjusted r2=0.41, F(1,12)=10.03, p=0.008). 
 
A particularly powerful, but likewise underexplored approach to construct validation consists in 
training individuals to solve a task in one domain and test to what extent they are able to apply their 
solution in a different domain. Intraspecific variation in this kind of cognitive flexibility (which is 
consistent with broad notions of general intelligence as applied by comparative scientists) should be 
correlated with psychometrically derived measures of individual g. Such a pattern would confirm that g is 
indeed a proxy of animal intelligence broadly defined.  
Equally promising is to focus on unusually difficult problems relative to individual performance 
(i.e. problems that cannot be solved in a routine way) across different cognitive domains and to assess 
whether to solve them, individuals recruit the same basic cognitive processes that are also strongly 
correlated with g, such as selective attention, or working memory capacity (Geary, 2009; Matzel, Sauce, 
& Wass, 2013).   
Finally, particularly rigorous validation would be based on extra-domain assays. Just as human g 
correlates with academic success, workplace success, health and even happiness (for references, see 
above), one could in principle ask whether g in animals is correlated with outcomes such as the size of 
cultural repertoires in nature, the ability to rise in social dominance, or to find food during periods of 
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scarcity, and thus survival and even fitness. Unfortunately, this approach is difficult to achieve because it 
requires both reliably quantifying g and the various real life outcomes in animals under natural conditions. 
More importantly, g may not necessarily predict basic fitness measures such as reproductive success, 
because of possible tradeoffs between investment into improving general intelligence and other vital 
activities, such as vigilance or social monitoring.  
Table 7 summarizes the issues discussed above in the form of criteria that may be fruitful to guide 
future studies. 
   
Table 7: Criteria that may be useful in guiding future efforts to (a) reliably identify g/G in nonhuman animals and 
(b) evaluate whether a statistically identified g/G captures intelligence in a broad sense, i.e. reasoning ability and 
behavioral flexibility. The last two columns indicate to what extent corresponding criteria have been applied in 
rodents and primates. See text for details (the relevant sections are indicated in italics) 
Criteria for future studies already applied in 
 rodents? (g) primates? 
a) to avoid statistical and methodological artifacts:   
• use of large samples and diverse tasks, and analytical routines that do 
not require an a priori categorization of tasks into domains (2.4.1) 
mostly (least 
for task 
diversity) 
partly 
• replication of results in independent samples (in particular when large 
samples are not available, 2.4.1)  
 
yes g: partly1  
G: yes 
• empirical control for confounds such as motivation, anxiety, or lower-
level biological properties (2.4.2) 
 
yes no 
• avoidance of tasks prone to secondary modularization (2.4.3) yes no 
 
b) to explore whether an empirical finding of g/G captures intelligence as 
broadly defined (2.5): 
  
• is g/G correlated with independently assessed executive functions? yes g: no 
G: yes 
• does executive function training, in contrast to a non-cognitive control 
training, increase g? 
 
yes no 
• is g/G correlated with brain size? yes g: no  
G: yes 
• is there evidence that g/G has been selected for? 
 
no yes 
• is g/G correlated with the ability to transfer solutions across domains 
(i.e. cognitive flexibility)? 
 
no no 
• does g predict performance in very difficult tasks? 
 
• does g predict success in real life? 
yes 
 
no 
no 
 
no 
 
1but not successfully: see Herrmann et al. 2010a; Hopkins et al. 2014; Woodley of Menie et al. 2015.   
 
3. Implications for the evolution of general intelligence  
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Taken together, although more validation remains to be done, especially in primates, the body of 
evidence is currently more consistent with the presence of domain-general cognitive abilities in primates 
and mice, reflected in g and G, than with the exclusive presence of independent, domain-specific 
cognitive adaptations. If general intelligence is not limited to humans, this inevitably leads to the question 
of the conditions favoring the evolution of general intelligence, to which we will turn now. Whereas the 
evolution of Fodorian, specific, dedicated cognitive adaptations in response to recurrent fitness-relevant 
problems is seemingly straightforward (but see 1.2.1), the evolution of general intelligence poses a 
puzzle. Domain-specific cognitive adaptions can be instantiated with modest amounts of neural tissue 
(Chittka & Niven 2009; Holekamp et al. 2015; Patton & Braithwaite 2015) and directly bring about 
fitness-relevant benefits. Domain-general cognitive ability, however, seems to require substantial amounts 
of additional expensive brain tissue (Deaner et al. 2007; Reader et al. 2011), and is not automatically 
linked to fitness-relevant benefits because survival-relevant skills have to be ontogenetically constructed 
during a process of learning (van Schaik & Burkart 2011). This ontogenetic construction may be more 
successful in individuals with higher cognitive ability, as posited by Investment Theory (Cattell 1987), 
but additional factors also come into play, which renders the link between cognitive ability and fitness-
relevant skills more fragile. For instance, whether a survival-relevant skill is acquired or not may also 
depend on chance (van Schaik & Burkart 2011, van Schaik et al. 2016). Furthermore, in order to more 
reliably translate general cognitive ability into fitness-relevant skills, some mechanisms for adaptive 
canalizations (as highlighted in section 1.2.2, Table 1) remain necessary, which have to co-evolve or, if 
already present, be linked to the evolving domain-general cognitive processes. We are therefore faced 
with the puzzle that domain-general cognitive ability apparently evolved in at least some lineages, or 
perhaps even in birds and mammals in general, even though its evolution has had to overcome more 
obstacles compared to the emergence of domain-specific cognitive adaptations. Hence, the goal of this 
section is to delineate the conditions favoring the evolution of general intelligence. 
 
3.1 General intelligence as response to domain-specific selection pressures 
The most common approach to explain variation in cognition across species, which has a long and 
venerable tradition, is to look for specific cognitive challenges in the social or ecological environment and 
investigate to what extent species facing these challenges have evolved bigger brains (Dunbar & Shultz 
2007a, 2007b; Holekamp et al. 2015; Humphrey 1976; Jolly 1966; Parker 2015; Parker & Gibson 1977). 
Comparative analyses, in particular in primates, have shown that brain size is indeed correlated across 
species with various social and ecological variables, such as social complexity based on bonded 
relationships (Dunbar 1992; Dunbar & Shultz 2007b) and tactical deception (Byrne & Corp 2004), or 
extractive foraging (Parker 2015), manipulative complexity (Heldstab, Kosonen, Koski, Burkart, van 
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Schaik & Isler 2016) and perceived seasonality (van Woerden, Schaik & Isler 2014; van Woerden, van 
Schaik & Isler 2010; van Woerden, Willems, van Schaik & Isler 2012). Shultz and Dunbar (2006) present 
similar analyses for ungulates, with similar conclusions. 
Nonetheless, much variation in brain size across species remains unexplained by domain-specific 
pressures (Holekamp 2007; van Schaik et al. 2012). Furthermore, not all species that excel in socio-
cognitive tasks, most likely because of their complex social environment, also excel in non-social tasks 
and evolve big brains. Socio-cognitive abilities in hyenas, for instance, are on a par with those of the 
larger anthropoid primates, but there is no evidence that like in primates, this would be correlated with 
particularly powerful cognitive abilities outside this domain (Holekamp 2015). Likewise, callitrichid 
monkeys outperform their sister lineage, capuchin and squirrel monkeys, in socio-cognitive abilities, but 
the latter have superior physical cognition (Burkart & van Schaik 2010; Burkart & van Schaik 2016). For 
additional examples of how specific sophisticated cognitive skills can be achieved with very small brains 
see Chittka and Niven (2009) for insects, or Patton and Braithwite (2015) for fish.  
The crucial question thus is: Under what conditions do specific cognitive challenges result in an 
increase in general intelligence (and thus brain size) rather than in domain-specific cognitive solutions 
that do not require large amounts of brain tissue and do not translate into benefits in other domains too?  
 
3.2 Direct selection on general intelligence 
Some have argued that general cognitive ability is not the result of a domain-specific challenge 
but that it was directly selected for so as to help animals cope with novel or unpredictable environments 
and overcome unusual or complex ecological challenges. According to this cognitive buffer hypothesis, 
large brains facilitate the construction of novel behavioral patterns through domain-general cognitive 
processes such as innovation and learning (Lefebvre, Reader & Sol 2013; Sol 2009). In support of this 
hypothesis, more innovative species tend to indeed have bigger brains in birds (Lefebvre, Whittle, 
Lascaris, & Finkelstein 1997) and primates (Reader & Laland 2002), and innovation rates in the wild are 
correlated with G across primate species (Reader et al. 2011). Furthermore, innovation rates and brain 
size, and thus presumably G, predict colonization success in birds (Sol et al. 2005), mammals (Sol, 
Bacher, Reader & Lefebvre 2008), amphibians and reptiles (Amiel, Tingley & Shine 2011), and fishes 
(Shumway 2008; but see Drake 2007). Furthermore, large-brained birds use more successful learned 
strategies to avoid collision with human vehicles on roads (Husby & Husby 2014). Finally, anthropoid 
primates (but not lemurs, rodents and omnivorous carnivores) cognitively buffer environmental 
seasonality (S. Graber et al. in prep.; van Woerden et al. 2014). Taken together, this work convincingly 
demonstrates that big brains are associated with greater behavioral flexibility and higher innovation rates 
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under naturalistic settings, and that these in turn can be beneficial for a range of species when they face 
novel and unpredictable environments.  
What remains to be answered in light of these obvious benefits, then, is why not all species 
evolved bigger and more powerful brains. It is self-evident that all extant species are clearly smart enough 
for their current niche, but it is equally evident that a slightly better understanding that traces of a predator 
actually mark its presence, a better memory for which food sources already have been visited, or better 
object permanence to better keep track of a disappearing prey would convey a fitness benefit relative to 
conspecifics. We suggest that it is unlikely that focusing exclusively on potential benefits resulting from 
gains in brain size will further advance our understanding of the conditions under which domain-specific 
pressures lead to increased general intelligence. Rather, answering this question requires a focus not only 
on the benefits, but also on the costs of evolving a bigger brain. 
 
3.3 Who can afford to evolve general intelligence? Cultural Intelligence 
Some species have larger brains than others which, at least in primates, is associated with higher 
G. Why did these species respond to domain-specific selection pressures with an increase in general 
intelligence (see also 3.1), or cope with environmental unpredictability by increasing their brain and 
intelligence, rather than opting for alternative, domain-specific adaptations (see also 3.2)? 
To answer these questions, it is important to keep in mind that the conditions under which large 
brains can evolve are to a substantial degree restricted by their costs (Isler & van Schaik 2014). Brains are 
energy-hungry organs that consume a large proportion of the energy available to an organism, in 
particular in growing immatures (Kuzawa et al. 2014). Thus, natural selection more readily favors an 
increase in brain size when this leads to an increase in net energy intake, a reduction in its variance, or 
ideally both. Furthermore, a big brain slows down the organism’s development, which means that a 
species’ ability to slow down its life history by increased survival is a fundamental precondition for its 
opportunity to evolve larger brain size. The latter is only possible for species who are not subject to 
unavoidable extrinsic mortality, such as high predation pressure: the life-history filter (van Schaik et al. 
2012). Isler & van Schaik (2014) have shown that such a cost perspective can explain a substantial 
amount of variation in brain size across primates, and that allomaternal care plays an important role in 
accommodating the costs associated with bigger brains (in particular because food subsidies by 
allomothers help paying for the energetic costs of the growing immatures, and because of life history 
consequences; see also Burkart, in press). 
Natural selection thus evaluates the net fitness benefit of a bigger brain, which also takes the costs 
into account. The balance of benefits and costs is critically influenced by how efficiently an individual 
can translate brain tissue (or general cognitive potential) into survival-increasing innovations, i.e. 
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knowledge and skills. The cultural intelligence approach stresses that species that rely more 
systematically on social learning are more efficient in ontogenetically constructing survival-relevant skills 
(Herrmann et al. 2007; van Schaik & Burkart 2011; van Schaik et al. 2012; Whiten & van Schaik 2007), 
because social influences are very powerful domain-general canalization processes, as highlighted in 
Table 1. Whereas in the human literature, many approaches stress the importance of social inputs in the 
development of intelligence (e.g. Tomasello 1999, Moll & Tomasello 2007), the evolutionary version of 
this approach that suggest that social learning also plays a crucial role for the evolution of intelligence and 
brain size has received far less attention. Importantly, it builds on a broad notion of social learning (Heyes 
1994, Box 1984, see also van Schaik, Graber, Schuppli and Burkart in rev for a classification of social 
learning particularly suitable to test the predictions of the evolutionary dimension of the cultural 
intelligence hypothesis). 
Consistent with the cultural intelligence approach, empirical results show that innovation rates in 
birds and primates are not only correlated with brain size or G, but also with the efficiency of social 
learning (Reader 2003; Reader et al. 2011). According to the cultural intelligence hypothesis, this is the 
case because, for species engaging systematically in social learning additional brain tissue translates more 
reliably in survival-relevant skills, which lowers the threshold for evolution to favor an increase in brain 
size and general cognitive ability compared with species that do not rely on social learning. The 
frequency of opportunities for social learning is thus part of the answer why some lineages did evolve 
bigger brains, whereas others did not, even though they would all benefit from being more intelligent (van 
Schaik & Burkart 2011). Put in other words, we can use the pattern of solutions to the canalization 
problem outlined in Table 1 to better understand under what conditions a species responds to a domain-
specific selection pressure with a domain-general adaptation rather than with a narrow, domain-specific 
modular adaptation. The core message of Table 1 was that all identified canalization problems can readily 
be overcome by social learning, and therefore, species able to rely more on social learning should be more 
likely to be able to evolve domain-general cognitive adaptations. In sum, the cultural intelligence 
approach seems to best accommodate the findings of general intelligence reviewed above. For a more 
detailed comparison and discussion of the different approaches, see van Schaik, Isler & Burkart (2012) 
and Burkart (in press). 
The cultural intelligence hypothesis was originally developed to explain why humans have 
evolved far bigger brains and far greater intelligence than other great apes. Tomasello (1999; see also 
Herrmann et al., 2007) stressed that humans have evolved of a set of species-specific socio-cognitive 
skills that facilitate social transmission, by allowing us to participate and exchange knowledge in cultural 
groups from an early age on. In other words, humans have become specialized in making use of social 
inputs to ontogenetically construct their skills, and rather than having evolved predominantly into a 
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“cognitive niche” (Pinker 2010), they have evolved into a “cultural niche” (Boyd, Richerson & Henrich 
2011). Our extreme dependence on socially guided ontogenetic construction of skills can also explain 
why the intraspecific link between g and brain size within humans is relatively weak (Pietschnig et al. 
2015; Muthukrishna & Henrich 2016). 
Humans can thus be seen as a special case of cultural intelligence, due to the active involvement 
of caretakers and the improved imitative abilities of our species. This view is consistent with approaches 
to human cognitive evolution that stress the role of allomaternal care, which not only results in energy 
subsidies to growing immatures, but also increases the scope of social learning through the availability of 
more, and more tolerant role models, who eventually also engage in teaching (Burkart, Hrdy, & van 
Schaik 2009; Hrdy 2009; Isler & van Schaik 2014; Burkart & van Schaik 2016; Kline 2015). 
 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Preliminary synthesis 
The current body of evidence reviewed above is arguably most consistent with general intelligence not 
being unique to humans but also present in other species, even though much validation remains to be 
done, as outlined in section 2.4 and 2.5. At present, the best-supported model for both animals and 
humans therefore views the ecological and social cognitive skills that can be measured in a species as the 
result of two pathways, as indicated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: The origin of cognitive skills. Green: Ecological and social cognitive skills that can be measured in 
animals and that are visible to natural selection because they can result in fitness benefits. Yellow: Empirical inter-
relations between brain size, general intelligence, and executive functions. The latter two entities are only visible to 
selection to the extent that they are translated into fitness-enhancing cognitive skills. Blue: Adaptive canalizations 
that either guide the ontogenetic construction of cognitive skills from general intelligence (see Table 1 for details) or 
represent fully-fledged Fodorian, modular adaptations that are independent of the domain-general (yellow) nexus. 
 
In the downward pathway, cognitive skills result from general intelligence, which shows strong 
empirical correlations with brain size and executive functions. These skills correspond to Cattell’s 
crystallized intelligence (Cattell 1963) and Geary’s secondary learning (Geary 2005). In this case, the 
cognitive skills are ontogenetically constructed, facilitated by mechanisms of adaptive canalization 
beyond Fodorian modularity (summarized in Table 1) and eventually may become automatized 
(secondary modularization, which makes these skills particularly difficult to identify). As stressed by the 
cultural intelligence approach, social learning is a particularly efficient mechanism of ontogenetic 
canalization, in particular in large-brained animals. In the upward pathway, cognitive skills directly 
emerge as a result of dedicated, Fodorian cognitive modules independent from general intelligence, 
executive functions (Firestone & Scholl 2015) or brain size.  
 These two pathways to cognitive skills can coexist, and in fact almost certainly do. This has 
major implications. First, closely related, big-brained species that rely to some significant extent on the 
39	
	
downward pathway and thus general intelligence may nevertheless exhibit rather distinct social and 
ecological skill sets. Some of their species-specific ontogenetic canalization mechanisms can result in 
species differences in performance in specific domains, such as extractive foraging and tool use. Second, 
species may not primarily vary with regard to whether they have g or not, but with regard to the relative 
importance of these two pathways in building their skill sets, consistent with the increasing evidence for g 
in several nonhuman species. Approaches like cultural intelligence and the expensive brain framework 
delineate the conditions under which one or the other is more likely to evolve. This model is thus 
consistent with the broad pattern of results summarized in this review, including the results of mixed-
species studies (section 2.3), and also with the idea of evolutionary continuity.  
 This preliminary synthesis suggests there is an alternative way of estimating the importance of 
general intelligence in a given species. Rather than exclusively relying on comparing the percentage of 
variance in performance explained by g (which in fact may be misleading, under the conditions outlined 
in section  2.4.1), one may attempt to estimate the importance of one pathway over the other in 
constructing an individual’s skill set. To do so, it is crucial to be able to distinguish the origin of the skills 
in the green box, whether they result from the upward or the downward pathway. This is particularly 
difficult because eventually, skills constructed via the upper pathway may become automatized, and thus 
difficult to distinguish from primary modules (see also Table 2 in section 1.2.3). To identify them, one 
needs to show that they critically rely on EFs (see also Table 6b) and show signs of being effortfully 
learned (see also Meulman et al. 2013; Schuppli et al. in press). This is most feasible when the learning is 
social, either by directly recording the socially induced patterns of attention and practice (e.g. Jaeggi et al. 
2010) or by interspecific cross-fostering (see section 2.4.3) where this is feasible. This alternative way of 
estimating the importance of general intelligence in a given species may turn out to be a promising 
complement to the alternatives pursued in nonhuman intelligence research so far. 
 
4.2 Conclusions 
Overall, the body of evidence from comparative studies lends increasing support to the notion 
that general intelligence is not unique to humans but also present in nonhuman animals and thus was not 
as tied up with language as some have suggested. Intra-specific evidence for g is particularly strong in 
rodents, whereas inter-specific evidence (G) finds most support from primate and bird studies. 
Nevertheless, the rather young field of research into animal general intelligence still needs to mature just 
like work on human intelligence took decades to mature.  
This enterprise can obviously profit from better integrating knowledge accumulated in the 
longstanding tradition of human psychometrics, not only with respect to the methodological aspects 
highlighted above, but also to conceptual issues. For instance, obvious parallels exist between Investment 
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Theory (Cattell 1987) and cultural intelligence approaches; pursuing them further may lead to novel 
insights. In other domains, however, superficial similarities are misleading. Modern massive modularity, 
for instance, based on very broad notions of modularity and inspired by evolutionary biology (Barrett 
2015), hardly informs the debate about whether general intelligence exists in nonhuman animals or not. 
Among nonhuman animals, the ancestral state most likely corresponds to animal minds being made up 
entirely of dedicated modular adaptations (Shettleworth 2012). Among extant species, the question is, 
which behaviors are (still) regulated this way?  
It is worth emphasizing that fruitful inputs can flow in the other direction too. For instance, the 
availability of valid animal models of general intelligence increasingly allows studying the underlying 
neurobiological and genetic mechanisms in ways that would not be possible in human studies (reviewed 
in Matzel et al. 2013; Plomin 2001; Galsworthy et al. 2014). Furthermore, via animal studies we can 
experimentally address the role of factors such as exploration tendency, known to be linked to g in mice 
(Grossman et al. 2007; Light et al. 2008), most likely via mechanisms stressed by Investment Theory 
(Cattell 1987). Finally, comparative studies are indispensable in addressing the broader question of where, 
why and how g evolved. Among the most promising evolutionary explanations for general intelligence is 
the cultural intelligence approach, which predicts the co-evolution of social learning and general 
intelligence. This perspective is strongly supported by interspecific studies where social learning but also 
other social abilities such as deception are strongly correlated with G across species (e.g. Reader et al. 
2011) and where brain size is linked to opportunities for social learning during development (van Schaik 
et al. 2012).  
A final issue concerns both animal and human studies. In most intraspecific studies, socio-
cognitive tasks were not part of the test battery, but where they were, the results were inconclusive. Thus, 
whereas Hopkins et al. (2014; Woodley of Menie et al. 2015) found socio-cognitive abilities loading on g 
in chimpanzees, Herrmann et al. (2010a) did not, neither in chimpanzees nor children. This may be 
because the intraspecific measures of socio-cognitive abilities used so far are less suitable than 
interspecific ones, for instance because they sometimes produce ceiling or floor effects. However, human 
test batteries typically also do not include social cognition, and the relationship between general 
intelligence and socio-cognitive abilities in humans therefore remains poorly understood (Korman et al. 
2015). Investigating the link between socio-cognitive abilities and general intelligence within humans 
thus is an important research priority. 
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Table 3: Intra-specific studies that have assessed and analyzed correlated performance across at least three cognitive tasks within subjects of the 
same species, for rodents, primates, and other species  
 
 Species (n) Test battery Key findings and conclusion Reference 
R
od
en
ts
 
Rats (22 +201) 4 tasks: attention to novelty, speed and 
accuracy of reasoning (8-arm radial maze), 
response flexibility (detour problem) 
Evidence for g in both samples; g is correlated with brain 
weight (second sample) 
Anderson, 1993 
Mice  
(two strains: 34 
+ 41) 
5 water escape tasks: route learning (Hebb-
Williams maze), use of spatial navigational 
cues (Morris water maze), spatial reversal 
learning and visual reversal learning (T maze), 
place learning (four arm maze);  
plus activity control task  
Evidence for g in both strains (explaining 61% and 55% of 
variance in the latency measures, and 28% and 37% in the 
error measures); authors stress limited implication for g 
because mainly spatial tasks; activity loads on first factor in 
strain A but not in strain B 
Locurto & 
Scanlon, 1998 
Mice (40) 6 tasks: curiosity (spontaneous alternation in 
T-maze), route learning (Hebb-Williams 
maze), use of spatial navigational cues (Morris 
water maze), detour problem (burrowing task), 
contextual memory, plug puzzle;  
plus anxiety in new environments (open field) 
Evidence for g (explaining 31% of variance); g is 
independent of anxiety 
Galsworthy et al., 
2002 
Mice (60) 6 tasks:  route learning (Hebb-Williams), 
place learning (plus maze), and a set of detour 
problems; 3 working memory tasks (eight arm 
radial maze, 4x4 radial maze, visual non-
matching to sample),  
plus 3 activity and stress control tasks 
No evidence for g (first factor explains 19.4% of variance, 
control tasks included in PCA)  
Locurto et al.,2003 
Mice (56) Standard mouse battery of 5 tasks: associative 
fear conditioning, operant avoidance, path 
integration (Lashley III maze), odor 
discrimination, and spatial navigation (Spatial 
water maze) 
plus open field exploration task 
Evidence for g (explaining 38% of variance); exploration 
propensity related to individual learning ability 
Matzel et al., 2003 
Mice (21) Variant of standard mouse battery  Evidence for g (explaining 43% of variance); g covaries Kolata et al., 2005 
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plus exploration task (open field), long term 
retention (retest in Lashley III maze after 30 
days) and working memory task (simultaneous 
performance in two eight arm radial mazes) 
with exploration and working memory capacity but not with 
long term retention 
Mice (84 unre-
lated1, and 167 
siblings) 
Tasks from Galsworthy et al. 2002 
plus object exploration and 2nd problem 
solving task 
Evidence for g (explaining 23% - 41% of variance); g 
shows sibling correlations of 0.17 – 0.21 and an estimated 
heritability of 40 % (upper-limit) 
Galsworthy et al., 
2005 
Mice (47+51) Exp. 1: 5 tasks: detour, win-shift, olfactory 
discrimination, fear conditioning and operant 
acquisition;  
plus open field and light-dark control tasks.  
Exp. 2: similar but optimized task battery 
(same detour and fear conditioning but 3 new 
tasks, including working memory); same 
control tasks 
Evidence for g (explaining 28% - 34% of variance) but only 
after removing control procedures from the analysis; g was 
stronger in the second experiment  
Locurto et al., 
2006 
Mice (43) Standard mouse battery; 
plus 21 tests of exploratory behavior, 
sensory/motor function (e.g. running and 
swimming speed, balance tasks, grip strength) 
and fitness, emotionality, and hormonal and 
behavioral stress reactivity 
 
Evidence for g (explaining 32% of variance); open field 
exploration and 7 other explorative behaviors also loaded 
on this first factor but g was not correlated with general 
activity, sensory/motor function, physical characteristics or 
direct measures of fear; lower level biological properties 
load weakly and inconsistently on g 
Matzel et al., 2006 
Mice (27) Standard mouse battery; 
plus selective attention (complex 
discrimination),  short term memory capacity 
(nonspatial radial arm maze), short term 
memory duration (delayed reinforced 
alternation)  
Evidence for g (explaining 44% of variance); g is most 
strongly correlated with selective attention, followed by 
simple memory capacity and only weakly with short-term 
memory duration  
 
Kolata et al., 2007 
Balb/C  Mice 
(56)  
Standard mouse battery 
plus working memory span and capacity, and 
12 non-cognitive tests of unlearned behaviors 
and fitness 
Evidence for g (explaining 31% of variance); old subjects 
(19-21 months of age) had lower g than young ones (3-5 
months of age) but also showed higher variability. Working 
memory capacity and duration explained variance in g, and 
Matzel et al., 2008 
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particularly so in old mice. Old mice with age-related 
cognitive decline had increased body weight and decreased 
activity. Some non-cognitive variables are also correlated 
with g. 
Mice (69) Standard mouse battery as adults;  
plus extensive exposure to 12 novel 
environments prior to testing 
Evidence for g (explaining 27 % of variance); exposure to 
novelty as juveniles (from 39 days of age) and young-adults 
(from 61 days of age) increased exploration but did not 
affect g compared to control groups when tested as adults 
(from 79 days of age) 
Light et al., 2008 
Mice (241) 
 
Standard mouse battery; subsample of 78 
subjects also tested with 2 additional spatial 
tasks (win-stay and reinforced alternation) 
Evidence for g (explaining 38% of variation); identification 
of additional domain-specific factor for tasks that depend on 
hippocampal/spatial processing in subsample   
Kolata et al., 2008 
Mice (60) Standard mouse battery; 
plus prefrontal cortex gene expression profiles  
Evidence for g (explaining 41-42 % of variance); 
dopaminergic genes plus one vascular gene significantly 
correlated with g; D1-mediated dopamine signaling in the 
prefrontal cortex is predictive of g, arguably through its 
modulation of working memory 
Kolata et al., 2010 
Mice (29) Standard mouse battery; 
plus extensive training on short term memory 
duration and working memory capacity and a 
selective attention task (Mouse-Stroop) 
Evidence for g (explaining 30 % of variance); working 
memory training promotes g, largely but not exclusively via 
increased selective attention; effects are smaller when 
selective attention load of training task is reduced 
Light et al., 2010 
Mice (42) Standard mouse battery: 
plus 2 exploration tasks (open field and novel 
environments) 
Evidence for g (explaining 40 % of variance); link between 
g and exploration propensity is mediated by different rates 
of habituation in high vs. low g subjects  
Light et al., 2011, 
experiment 2 
Mice (26) 
 
5 tasks: acquisition of three learning tasks 
(passive avoidance, shuttle avoidance, 
reinforced alternation), reversal learning in 
three tasks (shuttle avoidance, reinforced 
alternation, water maze) and selective 
attention.  
plus longitudinal working memory training 
(radial arm maze task with overlapping cues, 
Evidence for g (explaining 26 % - 37 % of variance); 
Longitudinal working memory training prevents age-related 
decline of attention, learning abilities and cognitive 
flexibility; non-cognitive variables load moderately to 
weakly on g and in a non-consistent manner; 
old (from 18 months of age); young (from 5 months of age) 
Matzel et al., 2011  
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various regimes) and plus four non-cognitive 
variables 
Mice (47) Standard mouse battery; 
plus deductive reasoning (inferring by 
exclusion: fast mapping) and inductive 
reasoning (efficient search strategy) 
Evidence for g (explaining 27% - 32% of variance); g 
correlates with inductive and deductive reasoning 
performance 
Wass et al., 2012 
Mice (26) 4 learning tasks: odor discrimination, 
reinforced alternation, fear conditioning, radial 
arm maze 
plus attention battery consisting of 4 tasks: 
Mouse-Stroop (conflicting visual and 
olfactory cues), T-Maze reversal, coupled 
latent inhibition, and dual radial arm maze 
Evidence for g (explaining 37% of variance); different types 
of attention (external: selective attention; internal: 
inhibition) contribute independently to variation in g 
Sauce et al., 2014 
Pr
im
at
es
 
Rhesus 
macaques 
(30+23) 
6 non-social tasks (n=30):  delayed non-
matching to sample (acquisition time and 
performance after 120 sec delay), delayed 
recognition span task (spatial and color 
condition), and reversal learning task (spatial 
and object condition) 
Evidence for g (explaining 48 % of variance), g but none of 
the other two extracted factors declines with age 
Age groups (age in years): young adults (<15), early-aged 
(19-23), advanced aged (24-28), and oldest aged (≥29). 
Herndon et al., 
1997 
Subset of the 6 tasks above (n=53): acquisition 
and 120’’ performance in delayed non-
matching to sample, spatial delayed 
recognition span 
Evidence for g (explaining 62 % of variance); g declines 
with age and is strongly correlated with g extracted from the 
full test battery 
Cotton-top 
tamarins (22) 
11 mostly non-social tasks3:  10 from the 
physical domain, 1 from the social domain  
Evidence for g (Bayesian latent variable approach) but no 
additional group factors (domains) 
Banerjee et al., 
2009 
Chimpanzees 
(106), 2 year 
old children 
(105) 
15 of the 16 tasks of the PCTB4 from the 
physical and social domain (tool use excluded) 
Confirmatory factor analysis reveals different factor 
structures for chimpanzees (factor 1: spatial tasks; factor 2: 
some physical and some socio-cognitive tasks) and children 
(factor 1: spatial tasks; factor 2: some physical tasks; factor 
3: six social tasks); 
Inconclusive regarding g for both human children and 
chimpanzees because of inclusion of social domain and low 
Herrmann et al., 
2010a 
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Notes:  
1In the second sample, variation in brain size was induced by prenatal exposure to methyl-azoxymethanol which induces microcephaly. 
2Data for 40 subjects was taken from Galsworthy et al. 2002 
variability in performance in some of the tasks. 
Chimpanzees 
(99) 
13 of the 16 tasks of the PCTB4 from the 
physical and social domain (without the 
number addition, social learning and intention 
task) 
 
Evidence for g (Parallel analysis); g is heritable  (h2=0.525, 
p=.008) 
Individual differences in cognitive performance and 
heritability remain stable in re-test after two years (n=86)  
Hopkins et al., 
2014  
 
Evidence for g (loadings of tasks on first factor range from 
0.048-0.607). Subtests with higher g loadings are more 
heritable, and are more variable between individuals 
Woodley of Menie 
et al., 2015 
O
th
er
 sp
ec
ie
s 
Dogs (13)  3 tasks: response latencies in discrimination, 
reversal learning, and visuo-spatial memory (3 
delayed non-matching to sample conditions) 
Highly significant correlations of performance across all 3 
tasks 
Nippak & 
Milgram, 2005 
Dogs (68 
border collies) 
6 tasks: four detour tasks, human point 
following and numerical discrimination 
Evidence for g; confirmatory factor analysis on 8 variables 
(4 detour performance plus speed and choice in point and 
discrimination task), with latent factors navigation speed, 
choice speed and choice accuracy, best fit for hierarchical 
model with g explaining 17% of variation. 
Arden & Adams 
2016 
Bowerbirds 
(21) 
6 ecologically relevant tasks (2 problem 
solving, one mimetic repertoire, and 3 bower 
building tasks) 
Weak evidence for g (explaining 27.5% of variance), but g 
as well as separate performance in four tasks is correlated 
with mating success 
Keagy et al., 2011 
New Zealand 
Robins (16) 
6 ecologically relevant tasks (1 motor task, 
color and shape discrimination, reversal 
learning, spatial memory and inhibitory 
control) 
plus motivation (sitting on an electronic scale 
and eating a mealworm) and neophobia 
(latency to touch the new apparatus) 
Evidence for g (explaining 34% of variance). Consistent 
pattern of results after removing the spatial memory task 
or/and subjects with a color preference. Even stronger 
evidence for g (45%) when removing both the motor task 
and subjects with a color preference from the PCA. 
Shaw et al., 2015 
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3Inhibition (occluded reach, A-not-B error, reversal learning), perceptual speed (targeted reach), exploration, numerical discrimination, acoustic discrimination, inspection 
time (objects and social), memory (hidden reward retrieval), food extraction puzzle 
4The PCTB (Primate Cognition Test Battery, Herrmann et al. 2007) consists of 16 tasks from the physical domain (space: spatial memory, object permanence, rotation, 
transposition; quantities: relative numbers, addition numbers; causality: noise, shape, tool use, tool properties) and the social domain (social learning; communication: 
comprehension, pointing cups, attentional state; Theory of Mind: gaze following, intentions).
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Table 4: Inter-specific, comparative studies that have assessed correlated cognitive performance across species  
Species (n) Type of study  Key finding Reference 
Primate species 
(116) 
Correlation of ecologically relevant cognitive abilities 
(innovation, tool use and social learning) and volume 
measures of the executive brain (neocortex and striatum) 
and brainstem (mesencephalon and medulla oblongata)  
The 3 measures were correlated across non-human 
primate species and with both absolute and relative 
executive brain volumes; results consistent with G 
Reader & 
Laland, 
2002 
Primate taxa (24)  
(3 great ape 
species, 1 lesser 
ape, and 7 
catarrhine, 6 
platyrrhine & 7 
prosimian genera) 
Meta-analysis of 9 experimental paradigms (detour 
problems, patterned-string problems, invisible 
displacement, tool use, object discrimination learning set, 
reversal learning, oddity learning, sorting, and delayed 
response) of captive subjects using hierarchical Bayesian 
latent variable analysis (Johnson et al, 2002) 
Species- G explains 85% of variance; great apes 
(Gorilla, Pan, Pongo) outperformed all other genera; G 
is positively correlated with various measures of brain 
size. 
Deaner et 
al., 2006, 
2007 
Primate species 
(62) (including 
apes, catarrhine 
and platyrhine 
monkeys, & 
prosimians) 
Meta-analysis on ecologically relevant tasks: behavioral 
innovation, social learning, tool use, extractive foraging 
(data from Reader and Laland,2002), and tactical deception 
(data from Byrne and Whiten, 1990) using principal 
component, factor and phylogenetic analyses  
Species- G explains 65% of the variance in cognitive 
performance and covaries with brain size. G also 
covaried with results from captive subjects, i.e. the 
species- G from Deaner et al, 2006 and learning 
performance from Riddel & Corl, 1977). 
Reader et 
al., 2011 
Primate species 
(69) 
(including apes, 
catarrhine and 
platyrhine 
monkeys, & 
prosimians) 
Meta-analysis of data sets from Reader et al. (2011, 
innovation, tool use, social learning, and extractive 
foraging) and Byrne and Whiten (1990, tactical deception) 
using Principal Axis Factor Analysis and Unit Weighted 
Factor Analysis 
Differences in cognitive abilities among primates are 
concentrated on G (explaining almost 62% of variance) 
and this effect is particularly pronounced in catarrhines 
(i.e. apes and Old World monkeys) 
Fernandes 
et al., 2014 
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Table 5: Mixed studies that have simultaneously anaylzed correlated performance within and between species  
Species (n) Type of study  Key finding Reference 
Chimpanzees 
(106) 
Orangutans (32) 
2.5-year old 
human children 
(105) 
Psychometric study using the Primate Cognitive Test 
Battery (PCTB) consisting of 16 tasks from the physical 
domain (space: spatial memory, object permanence, 
rotation, transposition; quantities: relative numbers, 
addition numbers; causality: noise, shape, tool use, tool 
properties) and the social domain (social learning; 
communication: comprehension, pointing cups, attentional 
state; Theory of Mind: gaze following, intentions) using 
analysis of variance 
Chimpanzees and human children performed equally 
well (and better than orangutans) in the physical domain 
but the children outperformed both ape species in the 
social domain; results not consistent with G 
Herrmann 
et al., 2007 
Bonobos, 
chimpanzees, 
gorillas and 
orangutans (23)  
8 non-social tasks from various studies: spatial knowledge 
(i.e. delayed response, inhibition, A-not-B, rotations, 
transpositions and object permanence), tool use (4 tests), 
inferential reasoning by exclusion, quantity discrimination, 
causal reasoning and color, size and shape discrimination 
learning 
No evidence for g; but some individuals perform 
consistently well across tasks  
Herrmann 
& Call, 
2012 
Chimpanzees (19), 
orangutans (10), 
bonobos (5), 
gorillas (8) 
long-tailed 
macaques (12), 
spider monkeys 
(18), 
capuchin monkeys 
(27) 
Re-analysis of data obtained from two psychometric studies 
resulting in 17 tasks from four physical domains (inhibition 
from Amici et al. 2008 and 2010, memory, transposition 
and support from Herrmann et al. 2007) with captive 
subjects using a hierarchical Bayesian modeling approach 
Most variance explained by species and cognitive 
domain; results not consistent with G 
Amici et 
al., 2012; 
Barney et 
al., 2015 
50	
	
References 
Abutalebi, J., & Clahsen, H. (2015) Bilingualism, cognition, and aging. Bilingualism: 
Language and Cognition 18(01):1-2.  
Amici, F., Barney, B., Johnson V. E., Call, J., & Aureli, F. (2012) A modular mind? A test 
using individual data from seven primate species. PLoS One 7(12):e51918.  
Amici, F., Aureli, F., & Call, J. (2008) Fission-fusion dynamics, behavioral flexibility, and 
inhibitory control in primates. Current Biology, 18(18):1415-1419.  
Amiel, J. J., Tingley, R., & Shine, R. (2011) Smart moves: effects of relative brain size on 
establishment success of invasive amphibians and reptiles. PLoS One 6(4):e18277.  
Anderson, M. L. & Finlay, B. L. (2014) Allocationg structure to function: the strong links 
between neuroplasticity and natural selection. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 918, 
1-16. 
Anderson, B. (1993) Evidence from the rat for a general factor that underlies cognitive 
performance and that relates to brain size: intelligence? Neuroscience Letters 153(1):98-
102. 
Aplin, L. M., Farine, D. R., Morand-Ferron, J., Cockburn, A., Thornton, A., & Sheldon, B. C. 
(2015) Experimentally induced innovations lead to persistent culture via conformity in 
wild birds. Nature 518(7540): 538-541.  
Arden, R. & Adams, M.J. (2016) A general intelligence factor in dogs. Intelligence 55: 79-85. 
Baddeley, A. (2010). Working memory. Current Biology 20:R136-140.  
Bailey, A. M., McDaniel, W. F., & Thomas, R. K. (2007). Approaches to the study of higher 
cognitive functions related to creativity in nonhuman animals. Methods, 42(1), 3-11. 
Banerjee, K., Chabris, C. F., Johnson, V. E., Lee, J. J., Tsao, F. & Hauser, M. D. (2009) 
General intelligence in another primate: individual differences across cognitive task 
performance in a New World monkey (Saguinus oedipus). PLoS ONE 4(6):e5883. 
Barbey, A. K., Colom, R., Solomon, J., Krueger, F., Forbes, C. & Grafman, J. (2012) An 
integrative architecture for general intelligence and executive function revealed by lesion 
mapping. Brain 135(4):1154-1164.  
Barney, B. J., Amici, F., Aureli, F., Call, J. & Johnson, V. E. (2015) Joint Bayesian Modeling 
of Binomial and Rank data for Primate Cognition. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 110(510):573- 582. 
Barrett, H. C. (2015) Modularity. In: Evolutionary Perspectives on Social Psychology, eds. V. 
Zeigler-Hill, L. L. M. Welling & T. K. Schackelford, New York: Springer International 
Publishing: 39-51. 
Barrett, H. C. & Kurzban, R. (2006) Modularity in cognition: framing the debate. 
Psychological Review 113(3):628-647.  
Barrett, H. C. & Kurzban, R. (2012) What are the functions of System 2 modules? A reply to 
Chiappe and Gardner. Theory & Psychology 22(5):683-688.  
Bartholomew, D. J., Deary, I. J., & Lawn, M. (2009). A new lease of life for Thomson’s 
bonds model of intelligence. Psychological review, 116(3), 567-579.  
Behrens, T. E. J., Hunt, L. T., Woolrich, M. W. & Rushworth, M. F. S. (2008) Associative 
learning of social value. Nature 456(7219):245-249.  
Bialystok, E., Craik, F. I. & Luk, G. (2012) Bilingualism: Consequences for mind and brain. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16(4):240-250.  
Bilalić, M., Langner, R., Ulrich, R. & Grodd, W. (2011) Many faces of expertise: fusiform 
face area in chess experts and novices. The Journal of Neuroscience 31(28):10206-10214.  
Blair, C. (2006) How similar are fluid cognition and general intelligence? A developmental 
neuroscience perspective on fluid cognition as an aspect of human cognitive ability. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29:109-160.  
Bolhuis, J. J., Brown, G. R., Richardson, R. C., & Laland, K. N. (2011). Darwin in mind: 
New opportunities for evolutionary psychology. PLoS Biol, 9(7), e1001109. 
Boyd, R., Richerson, P. J., & Henrich, J. (2011). The cultural niche: Why social learning is 
essential for human adaptation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
108(Supplement 2), 10918-10925. 
51	
	
Bouchard, T. J. (2014) Genes, evolution and intelligence. Behavioural Genetics 44(6):549-77.  
Brodin, A. (2010) The history of scatter hoarding studies. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 365(1542):869-881.  
Brown, J., Kaplan, G., Rogers, L. J. & Vallortigara, G. (2010) Perception of biological 
motion in common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus): by females only. Animal Cognition 
13(3):555-564.  
Burgess, G. C., Gray, J. R., Conway, A. R. A. & Braver, T. S. (2011) Neural mechanisms of 
interference control underlie the relationship between fluid intelligence and working 
memory span. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 140(4):674.  
Burkart, J. M. (in press) The evolution and consequences of sociality. In: Oxford Handbook 
of Comparative Psychology, eds. J. Call,  G. M. Burghardt, I. M. Pepperberg, C. T. 
Snowdon & T. Zentall. 
Burkart, J. M., Hrdy, S. B., & van Schaik, C. P. (2009) Cooperative breeding and human 
cognitive evolution. Evolutionary Anthropology 18:175-186.  
Burkart, J. M. & van Schaik, C. P. (2016). Revisiting the consequences of cooperative 
breeding. A response to Thornton & McAuliffe (2015). Journal of Zoology, doi: 
10.1111/jzo.12322. 
Burkart, J. M. & van Schaik, C. P. (2016) The cooperative breeding perspective helps pinning 
down when uniquely human evolutionary processes are necessary. Commentary to 
Richerson et al. (2016). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39, e34. 
Burkart, J. M. & van Schaik, C. P. (2010) Cognitive consequences of cooperative breeding. 
Animal Cognition, 31:1-19. 
Byrne, R. W. (1994) The evolution of intelligence. In: Behaviour and Evolution, eds. P. J. B. 
Slater & T. R. Halliday. Cambridge University Press. 
Byrne, R. W. & Corp, N. (2004) Neocortex size predicts deception rate in primates. 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B 271:1693-1699.  
Byrne, R.W. & Whiten A. (1990) Tactical deception in primates: the 1990 database. Primate 
Report 27:1-101.  
Cardoso, R. M. (2013) Resolução de problema por macacos-prego selvagens (Sapajus 
libidinosus) de duas populações com diferentes repertórios de uso de ferramentas. (PhD), 
Universidade de São Paulo.    
Carey, S. (2009) The Origin of Concepts. Oxford University Press. 
Carroll, J. B. (1993) Human cognitive abilities: A survey of factor-analytic studies. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Carruthers, P. (2005) The case for massively modular models of mind. In: Contemporary 
debates in cognitive science, ed. R. Stainton, pp. 205-225. Oxford, England: Blackwell. 
Carruthers, P. (2011) I do not exist. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15(5):189-190. 
Cattell, R. B. (1963). Theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence: A critical experiment. 
Journal of Educational Psychology, 54(1), 1-22. 
Cattell, R. B. (1987) Intelligence: Its Structure, Growth and Action. New York: Elsevier. 
Chang, Y. (2014) Reorganization and plastic changes of the human brain associated with skill 
learning and expertise. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8:35.  
Chabris, C. F. (2007) Cognitive and neurobiological mechanisms of the law of general 
intelligence. In: Integrating the mind: Domain general versus domain specific processes 
in higher cognition, ed. M. J. Roberts, pp. 449-491. Hove, Uk: Psychology Press. 
Chiappe, D. & Gardner, R. A. (2012) The modularity debate in evolutionary psychology. 
Theory & Psychology 22(5):669-682.  
Chittka, L. & Niven, J. (2009) Are bigger brains better? Current Biology 19(21):R995-R1008.  
Chudasama, Y. (2011) Animal models of prefrontal-executive function. Behavioral 
Neuroscience 125(3):327-343. 
Clune, J., Mouret, J. B., & Lipson, H. (2013). The evolutionary origins of modularity. 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 280(1755), 
20122863. 
Colom, R., Abad, F. J., Rebollo, I. & Shih, P. C. (2005) Memory span and general 
intelligence: A latent-variable approach. Intelligence 33:623-642.  
52	
	
Colom, R., Jung, R. E. & Haier, R. J. (2006) Distributed brain sites for the g-factor of 
intelligence. Neuroimage 31(3):1359-1365.  
Coltheart, M. (2011) Methods for modular modelling: additive factors and cognitive 
neuropsychology. Cognitive Neuropsychology 28(3-4):224-240.  
Cook, M. & Mineka, S. (1989) Observational conditioning of fear to fear-relevant versus 
fear-irrelaevant stimuli in rhesus monkeys. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 98:448-459.  
Cosmides, L. Barrett, H. C. & Tooby, J. (2010) Adaptive specializations, social exchange, 
and the evolution of human intelligence. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 107(Supplement 2):9007-9014.  
Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (1994) Origins of domain specificity: The evolution of functional 
organization. In: Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture, ed. L. 
Hirschfeld & S. Gelman. New York: Cambridge University Press, 85-116. 
Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (2002) Unraveling the enigma of human intelligence: Evolutionary 
psychology and the multimodular mind. In: The evolution of intelligence, eds. R. J. 
Sternberg & J. C. Kaufman, Erlbaum:145-198.  
Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (2013) Evolutionary Psychology: New Perspectives on Cognition 
and Motivation. Annual Review of Psychology 64:201-229.  
d'Souza, D. & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2011) When modularization fails to occur: A 
developmental perspective. Cognitive Neuropsychology 28(3-4):276-287.  
Davis, G. et al. (2011) Genome-wide association studies establish that human intelligence is 
highly heritable and polygenic. Molecular Psychiatry 16, 996-1005. 
Dahl, C. D., Chen, C. C., & Rasch, M. J. (2014). Own-race and own-species advantages in 
face perception: a computational view. Scientific reports, 4. 
Dean, L. G., Vale, G. L., Laland, K. N., Flynn, E. & Kendal, R. L. (2014) Human cumulative 
culture: a comparative perspective. Biological Reviews 89(2):284-301.  
Deaner, R.O., van Schaik C.P. & Johnson V. E. (2006) Do some taxa have better domain-
general cognition than others? A meta-analysis of nonhuman primate studies. 
Evolutionary Psychology 4:149-196. 
Deaner, R. O., Isler, K., Burkart, J. M. & van Schaik, C. P. (2007) Overall brain size, and not 
encephalization quotient, best predicts cognitive ability across non-human primates. 
Brain, Behaviour and Evolution 70(2):115-124.  
Deary, I. J., Penke, L. & Johnson, W. (2010) The neuroscience of human intelligence 
differences. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 11(3):201-211.  
Diamond, A. (2013) Executive functions. Annual Review of Psychology 64:135.  
Drake, J. M. (2007) Parental investment and fecundity, but not brain size, are associated with 
establishment success in introduced fishes. Functional Ecology 21(5):963-968.  
Ducatez, S., Clavel, J. & Lefebvre, L. (2015) Ecological generalism and behavioural 
innovation in birds: technical intelligence or the simple incorporation of new foods? 
Journal of Animal Ecology 84(1):79-89.  
Duchaine, B., Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (2001) Evolutionary psychology and the brain. 
Current Opinion in Neurobiology 11(2):225-230.  
Dunbar, R. I. M. (1992) Neocortex size as a constraint on group size in primates. Journal of 
Human Evolution 20:469-493.  
Dunbar, R. I. M. & Shultz, S. (2007a) Evolution in the Social Brain. Science 317:1344-1347.  
Dunbar, R. I. M. & Shultz, S. (2007b) Understanding primate brain evolution. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 362(1480):649-658.  
Embretson, S. E. (1995). The role of working memory capacity and general control processes 
in intelligence. Intelligence, 20(2), 169-189. 
Eraña, A. (2012) Dual process theories versus massive modularity hypotheses. Philosophical 
Psychology 25(6):855-872.  
Evans, J. S. B. (2011) Dual-process theories of reasoning: Contemporary issues and 
developmental applications. Developmental Review 31(2):86-102.  
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2013). Two minds rationality. Thinking & Reasoning, 20, 129-146. 
53	
	
Fernandes, H. B. F., Woodley, M. A. & te Nijenhuis, J. (2014) Differences in cognitive 
abilities among primates are concentrated on G: Phenotypic and phylogenetic 
comparisons with two meta-analytical databases. Intelligence 46:311-322.  
Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2015). Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the 
evidence for “top-down” effects. Behavioral and brain sciences, 1-72. 
Fodor, J. A. (1983) Modularity of the Mind: The MIT Press. 
Forss, S. I. F., Schuppli, C., Haiden, D., Zweifel, N. & van Schaik, C. P. (2015) Contrasting 
responses to novelty by wild and captive orangutans. American Journal of Primatology 
77(10):1109-1121.  
Frankenhuis, W. E. & Ploeger, A. (2007) Evolutionary psychology versus Fodor: Arguments 
for and against the massive modularity hypothesis. Philosophical Psychology 20(6):687-
710.  
Galef, B. G. (2015). Laboratory studies of imitation/field studies of tradition: Towards a 
synthesis in animal social learning. Behavioural Processes, 112, 114-119. 
Galsworthy, M. J., Arden, R. & Chabris, C. F. (2014) Animal models of general cognitive 
ability for genetic research into cognitive functioning. In: Behavior genetics of cognition 
across the lifespan, eds. D. Finkel & C. A. Reynolds, pp. 257–278. New York: Springer. 
Galsworthy,  M. J., Paya-Cano J. L., Monleo S. & Plomin R. (2002) Evidence for general 
cognitive ability (g) in heterogeneous stock mice and an analysis of potential confounds. 
Genes, Brain and Behavior 1:88-95. 
Galsworthy, M. J, Paya-Cano, J. L., Liu, L., Monleón, S., Gregoryan, G., Fernandes, C., 
Schalkwyk, L. C. & Plomin, R. (2005). Assessing reliability, heritability and general 
cognitive ability in a battery of cognitive tasks for laboratory mice. Behavioral Genetics 
35(5):675-92. 
Garcia, J. & Koelling, R. A. (1966) Relation of cue to consequence in avoidance learning. 
Psychonomic Science 4(1):123-124.  
Garson, D. G. (2013) Factor Analysis. Asheboro NC: Statistical Associates Publishing. 
Geary, D. C. (1995). Reflections of evolution and culture in children's cognition: Implications 
for mathematical development and instruction. American Psychologist, 50(1), 24. 
Geary, D. C. (2005) The origin of mind. Evolution of brain, cognition, and general 
Intelligence. Washington: American Psychological Association. 
Geary, D. C. (2009) The evolution of general fluid intelligence. In: Foundations in 
Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience, eds S. M. Platek & T. K. Shackelford. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press:22-56. 
Geary, D. C., & Huffman, K. J. (2002). Brain and cognitive evolution: forms of modularity 
and functions of mind. Psychological bulletin, 128(5), 667. 
Gelman, R. (1990). First principles organize attention to and learning about relevant data: 
Number and the animate-inanimate distinction as examples. Cognitive science, 14(1), 
79-106. 
Gläscher, J., Rudrauf, D., Colom, R., Paul, L. K., Tranel, D., Damasio, H. & Adolphs, R. 
(2010) Distributed neural system for general intelligence revealed by lesion mapping. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107(10):4705-4709.  
Glickman, S. E., & Sroges, R. W. (1966). Curiosity in zoo animals. Behaviour, 26(1), 151-
187. 
Gottfredson, L. S. (1997) Mainstream science on intelligence: An editorial with 52 
signatories, history, and bibliography. Intelligence 24(1):13-23.  
Greenough, William T., James E. Black, and Christopher S. Wallace. Experience and brain 
development. Child development (1987): 539-559. 
Grossi, G. (2014) A module is a module is a module: evolution of modularity in Evolutionary 
Psychology. Dialectical Anthropology 38(3):333-351.  
Grossman, H. C., Hale, G., Light, K., Kolata, S., Townsend D. A, Goldfarb, Y., Kusnecov, A. 
& Matzel, L. D. (2007) Pharmacological modulation of stress reactivity dissociates 
general learning ability from the propensity for exploration. Behavioral Neuroscience 
121(5):949.  
54	
	
Gruber, T., Muller, M. N., Reynolds, V., Wrangham, R. & Zuberbühler, K. (2011) 
Community-specific evaluation of tool affordances in wild chimpanzees. Scientific 
Reports 1:128.  
Heldstab, S. A.,  Kosonen, Z. K., Koski, S. E. Burkart, J. M., van Schaik, C. P., & Isler, K. 
Handy primates are clever primates. (2016.) Scientific Reports, 6. 
Herndon, J. G., Moss, M. B., Rosene, D. L. & Killiany, R. (1997) Patterns of cognitive 
decline in aged rhesus monkeys. Behavioural Brain Research 87:25-34. 
Herrmann, E. & Call, J. (2012) Are there geniuses among the apes? Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B 367:2753-2761.  
Herrmann, E., Call, J., Hernandez-Lloreda, M. V., Hare, B. & Tomasello, M. (2007) Humans 
have evolved specialized skills of social cognition: The Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis. 
Science 317:1360-1366.  
Herrmann E., Hernandez-Lloreda, M. V., Call J., Hare B. & Tomasello M. (2010a) The 
structure of individual differences in the cognitive abilities of children and chimpanzees. 
Psychological Science 21(1):102-110.  
Herrmann, E., Hare, B., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2010b). Differences in the cognitive skills 
of bonobos and chimpanzees. PLoS One, 5(8): e12438. 
Heyes, C. M. (1994). Social learning in animals: categories and mechanisms. Biological 
Reviews, 69(2), 207-231. 
Heyes, C. (2003) Four routes of cognitive evolution. Psychological Review 110(4):713-727.  
Heyes, C. (2012) What's social about social learning? Journal of Comparative Psychology, 
126(2):193-202.  
Heyes, C. (2016). Who Knows? Metacognitive Social Learning Strategies. Trends in 
cognitive sciences. 
Holekamp, K. E. (2007). Questioning the social intelligence hypothesis. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 11(2), 65-69. 
Holekamp, K. E., Dantzer, B., Stricker, G., Yoshida, K. C. S. & Benson-Amram, S. (2015) 
Brains, brawn and sociality: a hyaena's tale. Animal Behaviour 103:237-248.  
Hopkins, W. D., Russel, J. L. & Schaeffer, J. (2014) Chimpanzee Intelligence is heritable. 
Current Biology 24:1649-1652.   
Hoppitt, W., & Laland, K. N. (2013). Social learning: an introduction to mechanisms, 
methods, and models. Princeton University Press. 
Hrdy, S. (2009) Mothers & Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual Understanding. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Hufendiek, R. & Wild, M. (2015) Faculties and Modularity. In: The Faculties: A History, ed. 
D. Perler, pp. 254-299. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Humphrey, N. K. (1976) The social function of intellect. In: Growning Points in Ethology, 
eds. P. P. G. Bateson & R. A. Hinde, 303-317. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Husby, A., & Husby, M. (2014) Interspecific analysis of vehicle avoidance behavior in birds. 
Behavioral Ecology 25(3):504-508.  
Isler, K., & van Schaik, C. P. (2014) How humans evolved large brains: Comparative 
evidence. Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews 23(2):65-75.  
Jaeggi, A. V., Dunkel, L. P., Van Noordwijk, M. A., Wich, S. A., Sura, A. A. & van Schaik, 
C. P. (2010) Social learning of diet and foraging skills by wild immature Bornean 
orangutans. American Journal of Primatology 72:62-71.  
Jensen, A. R. & Weng, L.-J. (1994) What is a good g? Intelligence 18(3):231-258.  
Johansen-Berg, H. (2007) Structural plasticity: rewiring the brain. Current Biology 
17(4):R141-R144. 
Johnson, V. E., Deaner, R. O. & van Schaik, C. P. (2002) Bayesian analysis of rank data with 
application to primate intelligence experiments. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 97(457):8-17. 
Jolly, A. (1966). Lemur social behaviour and primate intelligence. Science, 153(3735):501-
506.  
55	
	
Joshi, P. K., Esko, T., Mattsson, H., Eklund, N., Gandin, I., Nutile, T., . . . Zhang, W. (2015) 
Directional dominance on stature and cognition in diverse human populations. Nature, 
523(7561):459-462.  
Jung, R. E. & Haier, R. J. (2007) The Parieto-Frontal Integration Theory (P-FIT) of 
intelligence: Converging neuroimaging evidence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
30(02):135-154.  
Kaegy, J., Savard, J. F & Borgia, G. (2011) Complex relationship between multiple measures 
of cognitive ability and male mating success in satin bowerbirds, Ptilonorhynchus 
violaceus. Animal Behaviour 81(5):1063-1070. 
Kahneman, D. (2011) Thinking, fast and slow. London, England: Penguin Books.  
Kan, K.-J., Kievit, R. A., Dolan, C. & van der Maas, H. V. (2011). On the interpretation of 
the CHC factor Gc. Intelligence 39(5):292-302.  
Kaufman, S. B., DeYoung, C. G., Reis, D. L., & Gray, J. R. (2011). General intelligence 
predicts reasoning ability even for evolutionarily familiar content. Intelligence, 39, 311-
322. 
Kendal, R. L., Hopper, L. M., Whiten, A., Brosnan, S. F., Lambeth, S. P., Schapiro, S. J. & 
Hoppitt, W. (2015) Chimpanzees copy dominant and knowledgeable individuals: 
implications for cultural diversity. Evolution and Human Behavior, 36(1):65-72.  
Kievit, R. A., Frankenhuis, W. E., Waldorp, L. J., & Borsboom, D. (2013). Simpson's 
Paradox in psychological science: A practical guide. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, Article 
513. 
Kline, M. A. (2015). How to learn about teaching: An evolutionary framework for the study 
of teaching behavior in humans and other animals. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 38, 
e31. 
Klingberg, T. (2010) Training and plasticity of working memory. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 14(7):317-324.  
Koenig, A. (1998) Visual scanning by common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus): functional 
aspects and the special role of adult males. Primates 39:85-90.  
Kolata, S., Light, K., Grossman, H. C., Hale, G. & Matzel, L. D. (2007) Selective attention is 
a primary determinant of the relationship between working memory and general learning 
ability in outbred mice. Learning & Memory 14(1-2):22–28. 
Kolata, S., Light, K. & Matzel, L. D. (2008). Domain-Specific and Domain-General Learning 
Factors are Expressed in Genetically Heterogeneous CD-1 mice. Intelligence 36(6):619-
629. 
Kolata, S., Light K., Townsend, D. A., Hale, G., Grossman, H. C. & Matzel, L. D. (2005) 
Variations in working memory capacity predict individual differences in general learning 
abilities among genetically diverse mice. Neurobiology of Learning and Memory 84:241–
246.  
Kolata, S., Light, K., Wass, C. D., Colas-Zelin, D., Roy, D. & Matzel, L. D. (2010) A 
dopaminergic gene cluster in the prefrontal cortex predicts performance indicative of 
general intelligence in genetically heterogeneous mice. PLoS One 5(11):e14036-e14036. 
Kolodny, O., Edelman, S. & Lotem, A. (2015) Evolved to adapt: A computational approach 
to animal innovation and creativity. Current Zoology 61:350-367.  
Kolb, B., & Gibb, R. (2015). Plasticity in the prefrontal cortex of adult rats. Frontiers in 
Cellular  
Neuroscience 9:15. 
Koops K., Furuichi, T. & Hashimoto, C. (2015) Chimpanzees and bonobos differ in intrinsic 
motivation for tool use. Scientific Reports 5:11356.  
Korman, J., Voiklis, J. & Malle, B. F. (2015) The social life of cognition. Cognition 135:30-
35. 
Krakauer, E. B. (2005). Development of Aye-Aye (Daubentonia madagascariensis) foraging 
skills: Independent exploration and social learning. Duke University, Durham NC.    
Kuzawa, C. W., Chugani, H. T., Grossman, L. I., Lipovich, L., Muzik, O., Hof, P. R., 
Wildman, D. E., Sherwood, C. C., Leonard W. R. & Lange, N. (2014) Metabolic costs 
56	
	
and evolutionary implications of human brain development. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 111(36):13010-13015.  
Lefebvre, L. (2013) Brains, innovations, tools and cultural transmission in birds, non-human 
primates, and fossil hominins. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7: 245.  
Lefebvre, L. (2014) Should neuroecologists separate Tinbergen's four questions? Behavioural 
Processes 117:92-96.  
Lefebvre, L., Reader, S. M. & Sol, D. (2004) Brains, innovations and evolution in birds and 
primates. Brain, Behavior and Evolution 63:233-246.  
Lefebvre, L., Reader, S. M. & Sol, D. (2013) Innovating innovation rate and its relationship 
with brains, ecology and general intelligence. Brain, Behavior and Evolution 81(3):143-
145.  
Lefebvre, L., Whittle, P., Lascaris, E. & Finkelstein, A. (1997) Feeding innovations and 
forebrain size in birds. Animal Behaviour 53:549-560.  
Lesage, E., Navarrete, G. & De Neys, W. (2013) Evolutionary modules and Bayesian 
facilitation: The role of general cognitive resources. Thinking & Reasoning 19(1):27-53.  
Light K. R., Grossman H., Kolata S., & Matzel L. D. (2011) General learning ability regulates 
exploration through its influence on rate of habituation. Behavioural Brain Research 
223(2):297–309.  
Light K. R., Kolata S., Hale G., Grossman H., and Matzel L. D. (2008) Up-regulation of 
exploratory tendencies does not enhance general learning abilities in juvenile or young-
adult outbred mice. Neurobiology of Learning and Memory 90:317-329. 
Light K. R., Kolata S., Wass C., Denman-Brice A., Zagalsky R., and Matzel L. D. (2010) 
Working memory training promotes general cognitive abilities in genetically 
heterogeneous mice. Current Biology 20:777-782. 
Locurto C. (1997) On the comparative generality of g. In:  Advances in cognition and 
education, vol. 4: Reflections on the concept of intelligence, eds. W. Tomic & J. Kigman,  
pp. 79-100. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.  
Locurto, C., Benoit, A., Crowley, C. & Miele, A. R. (2006) The structure of individual 
differences in batteries of rapid acquisition tasks in mice. Journal of Comparative 
Psychology, 120:378-388.  
Locurto, C., Fortin, E. & Sullivan, R. (2003) The structure of individual differences in 
heterogeneous stock mice across problem types and motivational systems. Genes, Brain 
and Behavior 2(1):40-55.  
Locurto, C. & Scanlon, C. (1998) Individual differences and a spatial learning factor in two 
strains of mice (Mus musculus). Journal of Comparative Psychology 112(4):344-352. 
Lotem, A. & Halpern, J. Y. (2012) Coevolution of learning and data-acquisition mechanisms: 
a model for cognitive evolution. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London B: Biological Sciences 367(1603):2686-2694.  
Luncz, L. V. & Boesch, C. (2014) Tradition over trend: Neighboring chimpanzee 
communities maintain differences in cultural behavior despite frequent immigration of 
adult females. American Journal of Primatology 76(7):649-657.  
MacLean, E. L., Hare, B., Nunn, C. L., Addessi, E., Amici, F., Anderson, R. C., . . . Barnard, 
A. M. (2014) The evolution of self-control. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 111(20):E2140-E2148.  
Macphail, E. M. (1982). Brain and intelligence in vertebrates. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Mahon, B. Z. & Cantlon, J. F. (2011) The specialization of function: Cognitive and neural 
perspectives. Cognitive Neuropsychology 28(3-4):147-155.  
Major, J. T., Johnson, W. & Deary, I. J. (2012) Comparing models of intelligence in Project 
TALENT: The VPR model fits better than the CHC and extended Gf–Gc models. 
Intelligence 40(6):543-559. 
Matsunaga, E., Nambu, S., Oka, M., Tanaka, M., Taoka, M. & Iriki, A. (2015) Identification 
of tool use acquisition-associated genes in the primate neocortex. Development, Growth 
& Differentiation 57(6):484-495.  
57	
	
Matzel, L. D., Grossman, H., Light, K., Townsend, D. & Kolata, S. (2008) Age-related 
declines in general cognitive abilities of Balb/C mice are associated with disparities in 
working memory, body weight, and general activity. Learning & Memory 15(10):733–
746.  
Matzel, L. D., Han, Y. R., Grossmann, H., Karnik, M. S., Patel, D., Scott N., Specht, S. M. & 
Gandhi C. C. (2003) Individual differences in the expression of a “general” learning 
ability in mice. The Journal of Neuroscience 23(16):6423-6433. 
Matzel, L. D., Sauce, B., & Wass, C. (2013) The architecture of intelligence. Converging 
evidence from studies of humans and animals. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 22(5), 342-348.  
Matzel, L. D., Townsend, D. A., Grossman, H., Han, Y. R., Hale, G., Zappulla, M., Light, K. 
& Kolata, S. (2006) Exploration in outbred mice covaries with general learning abilities 
irrespective of stress reactivity, emotionality, and physical attributes. Neurobiology of 
Learning and Memory 86:228-240. 
Matzel, L. D., Wass, C. & Kolata, S. (2011) Individual differences in animal intelligence: 
learning, reasoning, selective attention and inter-species conservation of a cognitive trait. 
International Journal of Comparative Psychology 24:36–59. 
Matzel, L. D., Light, K. R., Wass, C., Colas-Zelin, D., Denman-Brice, A., Waddel, A. C. & 
Kolata, S. (2011). Longitudinal attentional engagement rescues mice from age-related 
cognitive declines and cognitive inflexibility. Learning and Memory 18(5):345-356. 
McGrew, K. S. (2009) CHC theory and the human cognitive abilities project: Standing on the 
shoulders of the giants of psychometric intelligence research. Intelligence 37(1):1-10.  
Melnick, M. D., Harrison, B. R., Park, S., Bennetto, L., & Tadin, D. (2013). A strong 
interactive link between sensory discriminations and intelligence. Current Biology, 
23(11), 1013-1017. 
Meulman, E. J. M., Sanz, C. M., Visalberghi, E. & van Schaik, C. P. (2012) The role of 
terrestriality in promoting primate technology. Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, 
and Reviews 21(2):58-68.  
Meulman, E. J. M., Seed, A. M. & Mann, J. (2013) If at first you don't succeed… Studies of 
ontogeny shed light on the cognitive demands of habitual tool use. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 
368(1630):20130050.  
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A., & Wager, T. D. 
(2000). The unity and diversity of executive functions and their contributions to complex 
“frontal lobe” tasks: A latent variable analysis. Cognitive Psychology, 41(1), 49-100. 
Moll, H., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Cooperation and human cognition: the Vygotskian 
intelligence hypothesis. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: 
Biological Sciences, 362(1480), 639-648. 
Morrison, A. B. & Chein, J. M. (2011) Does working memory training work? The promise 
and challenges of enhancing cognition by training working memory. Psychonomic 
Bulletin & Review 18(1):46-60.  
Muthukrishna, M., & Henrich, J. (2016). Innovation in the collective brain. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 
Nippak , P. M. & Milgram, N. W. (2005) An investigation of the relationship between 
response latency across several cognitive tasks in the beagle dog. Prog 
Neuropsychopharmacol Biol Psychiatry 29(3):371-377. 
Nisbett, R. E., Aronson, J., Blair, C., Dickens, W., Flynn, J., Halpern, D. F. & Turkheimer, E. 
(2012) Intelligence: new findings and theoretical developments. American Psychologist, 
67(2):130-159.  
Ortiz, S. O. (2015) CHC Theory of Intelligence In: Handbook of Intelligence, ed. Goldstein et 
al. pp. 209-227. New York: Springer. 
Parker, S. T. (2015) Re-evaluating the extractive foraging hypothesis. New Ideas in 
Psychology 37:1-12.  
58	
	
Parker, S. T. & Gibson, K. R. (1977) Object manipulation, tool use and sensomotor 
intelligence as feeding adaptations in cebus monkeys and great apes. Journal of Human 
Evolution 6:623-642.  
Patton, B. W. & Braithwaite, V. A. (2015) Changing tides: ecological and historical 
perspectives on fish cognition. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 
6(2):159-176.  
Pavlicev, M. & Wagner, G. P. (2012) Coming to grips with evolvability. Evolution: 
Education and Outreach 5(2):231-244.  
Pietschnig, J., Penke, L., Wicherts, J.M., Zeiler, M., & Voracek, M. (2015). Meta-analysis of 
associations between human brain volume and intelligence differences: How strong are 
they and what do they mean? Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 57, 411-432. 
Pinker, S. (2010). The cognitive niche: Coevolution of intelligence, sociality, and language. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(Supplement 2), 8993-8999. 
Ploeger, A., & Galis, F. (2011) Evo devo and cognitive science. Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews: Cognitive Science 2(4):429-440.  
Plomin, R. (2001) The genetics of g in human and mouse. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 
2(2): 136-141.  
Pravosudov, V. V., & Roth II, T. C. (2013). Cognitive ecology of food hoarding: the 
evolution of spatial memory and the hippocampus. Annual Review of Ecology, 
Evolution, and Systematics, 44, 173-193. 
Prinz, J. J. (2006) Is the mind really modular? In: Contemporary Debates in Cognitive 
Science, ed. R. J. Stainton, pp. 22-36. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. 
Quartz, S. (2003) Toward a developmental evolutionary psychology: Genes, development and 
the evolution of cognitive architecture. In: Evolutionary Psychology: Alternative 
Approaches, eds. S. J. Scher & F. Rauscher, pp.185-210. Boston: Kluwer. 
Rabipour, S. & Raz, A. (2012) Training the brain: Fact and fad in cognitive and behavioral 
remediation. Brain and Cognition 79(2):159-179. 
Reader, S. M. (2003) Innovation and social learning: individual variation and brain evolution. 
Animal Biology 53:147-158.  
Reader, S. M., Hager, Y. & Laland, K. N. (2011) The evolution of primate general and 
cultural intelligence. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences, 366(1567):1017-1027.  
Reader, S. M. & Laland, K. N. (2002) Social intelligence, innovation and enhanced brain size 
in primates. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 99:4436-4441.  
Reeve, C. L. (2004) Differential ability antecedents of general and specific dimensions of 
declarative knowledge: More than g. Intelligence 32(6):621-652.  
Reyes-García, V., Pyhälä, A., Díaz-Reviriego, I., Duda, R., Fernández-Llamazares, Á., 
Gallois, S., Guèze, M. and Napitupulu, L. (2016). Schooling, Local Knowledge and 
Working Memory: A Study among Three Contemporary Hunter-Gatherer Societies. PloS 
one, 11(1). 
Richerson, P. J., Baldini, R., Bell, A., Demps, K., Frost, K., Hillis, V., Mathew, S., Newton, 
N. , Narr, N., Newson, L.; Ross, C., Smaldino, P., Waring, T. & Zefferman, M. (2016) 
Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation: A 
sketch of the evidence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.  
Riddell, W. I. & Corl, K. G. (1977) Comparative investigation of the relationship between 
cerebral indices and learning abilities. Brain, Behavior and Evolution 14:385-398. 
Royall, D. R. & Palmer, R. F. (2014) “Executive functions” cannot be distinguished from 
general intelligence: two variations on a single theme within a symphony of latent 
variance. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience 8(369):1-10.  
Rumbaugh, D. M. & Washburn, D. A. (2003) Intelligence of Apes and Other Rational 
Beings. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Saklofske, D. H., van de Vijver, F. J., Oakland, T., Mpofu, E., & Suzuki, L. A. (2014). 
Intelligence and Culture: History and Assessment. Handbook of Intelligence: 
Evolutionary Theory, Historical Perspective, and Current Concepts, 341. 
59	
	
Sale, A., Berardi, N. & Maffei, L. (2014). Environment and brain plasticity: towards an 
endogenous pharmacotherapy. Physiological Reviews 94(1):189-234. 
Samuels, R. (2004). Innateness in cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(3), 
136141. 
Sauce, B., Wass, C., Smith, A., Kwan, S. & Matzel, L. D. (2014) The external-internal loop 
of interference: Two types of attention and their influence on the learning abilities of 
mice. Neurobiology of Learning and Memory 116:181-192.  
Savage-Rumbaugh, S., Fields, W. M., Segerdahl, P. & Rumbaugh, D. (2005) Culture 
prefigures cognition in Pan/Homo bonobos. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y 
Fundamentos de la Ciencia 20(3):311-328.  
Schlosser, G. & Wagner, G. P. (2004) Modularity in development and evolution. University 
of Chicago Press. 
Schubiger, M. N., Wüstholz, F. L., Wunder, A. & Burkart, J. M. (2015). High emotional 
reactivity toward an experimenter affects participation, but not performance, in cognitive 
tests with common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus). Animal Cognition 18(3):701-712.  
Schuppli, C., Isler, K., & van Schaik, C. P. (2012). How to explain the unusually late age at 
skill competence among humans. Journal of human evolution, 63(6), 843-850. 
Schuppli, C., Meulman, E., Forss, S. F., van Noordwijk, M. & van Schaik, C. P. (in rev.) 
Observational social learning and socially induced practice of routine skills in wild 
immature orang-utans. 
Schubiger, M. N., Kissling, A., & Burkart J. B. (in press). How task format affects cognitive 
performance: A memory test with two species of New World monkeys. Animal 
Behaviour. 
Shah, P., Happé, F., Sowden, S., Cook, R., & Bird, G. (2015). Orienting Toward Face-Like 
Stimuli in Early Childhood. Child Development, 86(6), 1693-1700. 
Shaw, R. C., Boogert, N. J., Clayton, N. S. & Burns, K. C. (2015) Wild psychometrics: 
evidence for ‘general’cognitive performance in wild New Zealand robins, Petroica 
longipes. Animal Behaviour 109:101-111.  
Sheppard, L. D., & Vernon, P. A. (2008). Intelligence and speed of information-processing: A 
review of 50 years of research. Personality and Individual Differences, 44(3), 535-551. 
Shepherd, S. V. (2010) Following gaze: gaze-following behavior as a window into social 
cognition. Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience 4.  
Sherry, D. F. (2006) Neuroecology. Annual Review of Psychology 57:167-197.  
Shettleworth, S. J. (2012) Darwin, Tinbergen, and the evolution of comparative cognition. 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Evolutionary Psychology, pp. 529-546.  
Shettleworth, S. J. (2012) Modularity, comparative cognition and human uniqueness. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 367(1603):2794-2802.  
Shipstead, Z., Redick, T. & Engle, R. W. (2012) Is working memory training effective? 
Psychological Bulletin 138(4):628.  
Shultz, S. & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2006) Both social and ecological factors predict ungulate brain 
size. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 273(1583):207-215.  
Shumway, C. A. (2008) Habitat complexity, brain, and behavior. Brain, Behavior and 
Evolution 72(2):123-134.  
Sol, D. (2009) Revisiting the cognitive buffer hypothesis for the evolution of large brains. 
Biology Letters 5(1):130-133.  
Sol, D., Bacher, S., Reader, S. M. & Lefebvre, L. (2008) Brain size predicts the success of 
mammal species introduced into novel environments. The American Naturalist 
172(S1):S63-S71.  
Sol, D., Duncan, R. P., Blackburn, T. M., Cassey, P. & Lefebvre, L. (2005) Big brains, 
enhanced cognition, and response of birds to novel enivronments. PNAS, 102(15):5460-
5465.  
Spelke, E. S. & Kinzler, K. D. (2007) Core knowledge. Developmental science, 10(1):89-96.  
Spearman C. (1927) The Abilities of Man. Oxford, England: Macmillan. xxii 415pp.   
60	
	
Sperber, D. (2001) In defense of massive modularity. In: Language, Brain and Cognitive 
Devolopment: Essays in honor of Jacques Mehler, ed. E. Dupoux (Ed.), 47-57. 
Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Sternberg, S. (2011) Modular processes in mind and brain. Cognitive Neuropsychology 28(3-
4):156-208.  
Stevens, J. P. (2012). Applied multivariate statistics for the social sciences. Routledge  
Tabachnick, B. & Fidell, L. eds. (2007) Using Multivariate Statistics 5th edition. Pearson 
Education. 
Strasser, A., & Burkart, J. M. (2012). Can we measure brain efficiency? An empirical test 
with common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus). Brain, Behavior and Evolution, 80(1), 26-
40. 
Tapp, P. D., Siwak, C. T., Estrada, J., Head, E., Muggenburg, B. A., Cotman, C. W. & 
Milgram, N. W. (2003) Size and reversal learning in the beagle dog as a measure of 
executive function and inhibitory control in aging. Learning & Memory 10(1):64-73.  
Teubert, M., Vierhaus, M. & Lohaus, A. (2011) Frühkindliche Untersuchungsmethoden zur 
Intelligenzprognostik. Psychologische Rundschau, 62(2):70-77.  
Thorsen, C., Gustafsson, J. E. & Cliffordson, C. (2014) The influence of fluid and crystallized 
intelligence on the development of knowledge and skills. British Journal of Educational 
Psychology 84(4):556-570.  
Tinbergen, N. (1963) On aims and methods of ethology. Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie, 
20(4): 410-433.  
Toates, F. (2005) Evolutionary psychology–towards a more integrative model. Biology and 
Philosophy, 20(2-3):305-328.  
Tomasello, M. (1999) The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (1997) Primate Cognition. New York: Oxford University Press. 
van der Maas, H. L., Dolan, C. V., Grasman, R. P., Wicherts, J. M., Huizenga, H. M., & 
Raijmakers, M. E. (2006). A dynamical model of general intelligence: The positive 
manifold of intelligence by mutualism. Psychological Review, 113, 842-861. 
van de Waal, E., Borgeaud, C. & Whiten, A. (2013). Potent social learning and conformity 
shape a wild primate’s foraging decisions. Science 340(6131):483-485.  
van Schaik, C. P. (2016) The primate origins of human nature. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. 
van Schaik, C. P., Ancrenaz, M., Borgen, G., Galdikas, B., Knott, C. D., Singleton, I., Suzuki, 
A., Suci , S. U., & Merrill, M. (2003). Orangutan cultures and the evolution of material 
culture. Science 299: 102-105. 
van Schaik, C. P. & Burkart, J. M. (2011) Social learning and evolution: the cultural 
intelligence hypothesis. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences 366(1567). 
van Schaik, C. P., Burkart, J. M., Damerius, L., Forss, S., Koops, K., van Noordwij, M. & 
Schuppli, C. (2016). The reluctant innovator: Orangutans and the phylogeny of creativity. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 371(1690), 20150183 
van Schaik, C. P., Deaner, R. O. & Merrill, M. Y. (1999) The conditions for tool use in 
primates: implications for the evolution of material culture. Journal of Human Evolution 
36:719-741.  
van Schaik, C. P., Graber, S. M., Schuppli, C. & Burkart, J. M. (in rev.). The ecology of 
social learning in animals and its link with intelligence. Spanish Journal of Comparative 
Psychology. 
van Schaik, C. P., Isler, K. & Burkart, J. M. (2012) Explaining brain size variation: from 
social to cultural brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16(5): 277-284. 
van Woerden, J. T., van Schaik, C. P. & Isler, K. (2014) Brief Communication: Seasonality of 
diet composition is related to brain size in New World Monkeys. American Journal of 
Physical Anthropology 154(4):628-632.  
van Woerden, J. T., van Schaik, C. P. & Isler, K. (2010) Effects of seasonality on brain size 
evolution: evidence from strepsirrhine primates. The American Naturalist 176(6):758-
767.  
61	
	
van Woerden, J. T., Willems, E. P., van Schaik, C. P. & Isler, K. (2012) Large brains buffer 
energetic effects of seasonal habitats in catarrhine primates. Evolution 66(1):191-199.  
Voelkl, B., Schrauf, C. & Huber, L. (2006) Social contact influences the response of infant 
marmosets towards novel food. Animal Behaviour 72:365-372.  
Wass, C., Denman-Brice, A., Light, K. R., Kolata, S., Smith A. M. & Matzel L. D. (2012) 
Covariation of learning and "reasoning" abilities in mice: evolutionary conservation of 
the operations of intelligence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior 
Processes 38(2):109-124. 
Whiten, A. & van Schaik, C. P. (2007) The evolution of animal "cultures" and social 
intelligence. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 
362(1480):603-620.  
Woodley of Menie, M. A., Fernandes, H. B. F. & Hopkins, W. D. (2015) The more g-loaded, 
the more heritable, evolvable, and phenotypically variable: Homology with humans in 
chimpanzee cognitive abilities. Intelligence 50:159-163.  
Wooldridge, D. E. (1968) Mechanical man: The physical basis of intelligent life. McGraw-
Hill Companies. 
Yamamoto, M. E., Domeniconi, C. & Box, H. (2004). Sex differences in common marmosets 
(Callithrix jacchus) in response to an unfamiliar food task. Primates 45:249-254.  
Yoerg, S. I. (2001) Clever as a Fox. Animal Intelligence and what it can teach us about 
ourselves. New York: Bloomsbury. 
